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Symposium	  on	  Notice	  and	  Notice	  Failure	  in	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  forthcoming	  in	  96	  Boston	  University	  Law	  Review	  (2016)	  	  	  	  What	  Notice	  Did	  	  –	  Jessica	  Litman*	  	  	  	  	   In	  the	  21st	  century,	  copyright	  protection	  is	  automatic.	   	  It	  vests	  in	  eligible	  works	  the	  instant	   that	   those	  works	   are	   first	   embodied	   in	   a	   tangible	   format.1	   	  Many	   Americans	   are	  unaware	   of	   that,	   believing	   instead	   that	   registration	   and	   copyright	   notice	   are	   required	   to	  secure	   a	   copyright.2	   	   That	   impression	   is	   understandable.	   	   For	   its	   first	   199	   years,	   United	  States	   copyright	   law	   required	   authors	   to	   take	   affirmative	   steps	   to	   obtain	   copyright	  protection.	   	   The	   first	   U.S.	   copyright	   statute,	   enacted	   by	   Congress	   in	   1790,	   required	   the	  eligible	  author	  of	  an	  eligible	  work3	  to	  record	  the	  title	  of	  the	  work	  with	  the	  clerk	  of	  the	  court	  in	  the	  author's	  local	  district,	  	  deposit	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  printed	  title	  with	  the	  clerk's	  office,	  cause	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  registration	  record	  to	  be	  printed	  for	  four	  weeks	  running	  in	  a	  newspaper,	  and	  deliver	   a	   copy	   of	   the	   published	   work	   to	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State.4	   Twelve	   years	   later,	  Congress	   added	   an	   additional	   	   requirement:	   	   copyright	   owners	  must	   place	   a	   prescribed	  
                                                           *	  	   John	  F.	  Nickoll	  Professor	  of	  Law	  and	  Professor	  of	  Information,	  University	  of	  Michigan.	  	  I’d	  like	  to	  thank	  Wendy	  Gordon	  and	  Stacey	  Dogan	  for	  persuading	  me	  to	  think	  about	  these	  questions,	  and	  Jane	  Ginsburg,	  Laura	  Harlow,	  and	  Jon	  Weinberg	  for	  extremely	  useful	  comments	  on	  an	  earlier	  draft.	  	  1	   17	  U.S.C.	  §	  102	  (2012).	  	  2	   When	  I	  presented	  an	  early	  version	  of	  this	  project	  at	  a	  faculty	  lunch,	  I	  began	  by	  explaining	  that	  while	  copyright	  protection	  is	  now	  automatic,	  U.S.	  law	  used	  to	  require	  publication,	  notice,	  and	  registration	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  a	  copyright.	  	  My	  colleagues,	  brilliant	  lawyers	  all	  and	  most	  of	  them	  too	  young	  to	  have	  run	  into	  copyright	  law	  before	  1976,	  expressed	  great	  surprise	  that	  copyright	  protection	  no	  longer	  required	  publication,	  notice,	  or	  registration.	  	  3	   Copyright	  protection	  under	  the	  1790	  Act	  was	  limited	  to	  maps,	  charts,	  and	  books	  authored	  by	  U.S.	  citizens	  or	  residents.	  	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1790,	  1	  Stat.	  124,	  1st	  Cong.	  2d	  Sess.	  §	  1	  (1790).	  	  	  4	   Copyright	  Act	  of	  1790	  §§	  2,	  3,	  4.	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copyright	  notice	  on	  every	  copy	  of	  a	  copyrighted	  work.5	   In	  1909,	  Congress	  eliminated	  the	  registration	   and	   deposit	   pre-­‐requisites	   for	   protection,	   but	   retained	   until	   1978	   the	  requirement	  that	  accurate	  copyright	  notice	  appear	  on	  every	  copy	  of	  a	  work.6	  For	  176	  years	  of	  United	  States	  copyright	  history,	  then,	  accurate	  copyright	  notice	  was	  essential	  to	  securing	  a	  copyright	  in	  almost	  all	  works.7	  Publishing	  copies	  of	  a	  work	  without	  copyright	  notice,	  or	  with	  the	  wrong	  name	  in	  the	  notice,	  was	  fatal	  to	  copyright	  protection.8	  	  	   Scholarly	  commentary	  on	  copyright	  notice	  has	  tended	  to	  tell	  two	  conflicting	  stories.	  	  In	   the	   first	   story,	   the	   notice	   prerequisite	   was	   confiscatory,	   serving	   primarily	   to	   divest	  deserving	  authors	  of	   the	  protection	   they	  earned	   through	   their	   creativity.9	   	   In	   the	   second	  story,	   conditioning	   copyright	   protection	   on	   the	   presence	   of	   accurate	   copyright	   notice	  helped	   to	   assure	   that	   copyright	   protection	   attached	   to	   works	   whose	   owners	   valued	  copyright	   protection	   while	   leaving	   other	   potentially	   copyrighted	   material	   in	   the	   public	  
                                                           5	   Act	  of	  April	  29,	  1802,	  2	  Stat.	  171	  	  (1802).	  	  Notice	  under	  the	  1802	  Act	  duplicated	  the	  language	  of	  the	  copyright	  registration	  record:	  	  “Entered	  according	  to	  act	  of	  Congress	  the	  [date]	  day	  of	  [month]	  [year]	  by	  [name	  of	  author	  or	  proprietor]	  of	  [State].”	  Id	  §	  1.	  	  6	   In	   1976,	   Congress	   extended	   automatic	   copyright	   protection	   to	   any	   work	   upon	   its	   fixation	   in	   tangible	   form.	   	   It	  retained	   the	   requirement	   of	   copyright	   notice	   in	   order	   to	   preserve	   copyright	   protection,	   but	   eliminated	   the	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  copyright	  notice	  was	  accurate.	  	  See	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1976,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  94-­‐533,	  90	  Stat.	  2541	  §§	  102,	  401,	  402,	  404,	  405,	  406	  (1976).	   	  In	  1988,	  Congress	  eliminated	  the	  notice	  requirement	  entirely	  for	  works	  that	  had	  not	  been	  published	  as	  of	  the	  effective	  date	  of	  the	  Act.	  See	  Berne	  Convention	  Implementation	  Act,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  100-­‐568,	  102	  Stat.	  2853	  §	  7	  (1988),	  codified	  at	  17	  U.S.C.	  §§	  401,	  402.	  	  7	   See,	   e.g.,	   Vince	   A.	   Doyle,	   George	   D.	   Cary,	   Marjorie	   McCannon,	   and	   Barbara	   A.	   Ringer,	   Study	   No.	   7:	   	   Notice	   of	  Copyright,	  Studies	  on	  Copyright	  5	  (1957):	  	   Among	  the	  basic	  conditions	  for	  protection	  provided	  in	  the	  U.S.	  copyright	  law	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	   is	   the	   requirement	   for	   a	   copyright	   notice.	   To	   secure	   and	   maintain	   copyright	   in	   the	   United	  States,	   the	   copies	   of	   a	   work	   published	   in	   this	   country	   must	   bear	   a	   notice	   in	   the	   form	   and	   position	  specified	  in	  the	  statute.	  Publication	  of	  a	  work	  without	  the	  prescribed	  notice	  results	  in	  the	  permanent	  loss	  of	  copyright	  protection	  and	  places	  the	  work	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  	   The	   1909	   Act	   permitted	   unpublished	   lectures,	   plays,	   musical	   compositions,	   photographs	   and	   paintings	   to	   be	  secured	  through	  registration	  rather	  than	  publication	  with	  notice.	  	  Act	  of	  Mar.	  4,	  1909,	  §	  11,	  35	  Stat.	  1075,	  1078.	  If	  copies	  of	  those	  works	  were	  later	  distributed	  to	  the	  public,	  though,	  each	  copy	  	  needed	  a	  correct	  copyright	  notice.	  	  8	   E.g.,	  Mifflin	  v.	  R.H.	  White,	  190	  U.S.	  260,	  264	  (1903).	  The	  rules	  concering	  copyright	  notices	  bearing	  the	  wrong	  date	  depended	  on	  the	  statutory	  	  class	  	  of	  the	  work	  and	  whether	  the	  date	  was	  later	  or	  earlier	  than	  the	  actual	  date	  of	  first	  publication.	  	  See	  generally	  Study	  No.	  7:	  	  Notice	  of	  Copyright,	  supra	  note	  7.	  	  9	   See,	  e.g.,	  Jane	  C,	  Ginsburg,	  “With	  Untired	  Spirits	  and	  Formal	  Constancy”:	  Berne-­‐Compatibility	  of	  Formal	  Declaratory	  Measures	  to	  Enhance	  Copyright	  Title-­‐	  Searching,	  28	  Berkeley	  Tech.	  L.J.	  1583,	  1584-­‐85	  (2013).	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domain.10	   	   	   Requiring	   copyright	   notice,	   thus,	   allowed	   United	   States	   law	   to	   tolerate	   a	  broader	   range	   of	   potentially	   copyrightable	   subject	   matter	   and	   a	   lower	   threshold	   for	  originality	   than	   other	   countries	   found	   workable.11	   Copyright	   notice,	   further,	   enabled	  members	  of	  the	  public	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  copyright	  protection	  subsisted	  in	  a	  work	  and,	  if	  so,	  who	  owned	  it.12	  	  	  I	  am	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  second	  story	  than	  the	  first,13	  but	  here	  I	  want	   to	   pursue	   a	   different	   question.	   	   In	   this	   article,	   I	   explore	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   notice	  prerequisite	  on	  the	  law's	  treatment	  of	  copyright	  ownership.	  	  	   	  My	  reading	  of	  the	  cases	  has	  persuaded	  me	  that	  the	  notice	  prerequisite,	  as	  construed	  by	  the	  courts,	  encouraged	  the	  development	  of	  legal	  doctrines	  surrounding	  ownership	  that	  herded	  the	  ownership	  of	  copyrights	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  publishers	  and	  other	  intermediaries,	  notwithstanding	  statutory	  provisions	   that	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  designed	  at	   least	   in	  part	   to	  enable	   authors	   to	  keep	   their	   copyrights.	   	   I	   don't	  mean	   to	   suggest	   that	   anyone	  adopted	  a	  notice	  prerequisite	  with	  this	  purpose;	  I	  think	  the	  purpose	  of	  copyright	  notice	  was	  always	  understood	  as	  protecting	  members	  of	  the	  public	  by	  informing	  them	  that	  a	  copy	  embodied	  a	  work	   protected	   by	   copyright,	   and	   telling	   them	   who	   controlled	   it.14	   	   Nonetheless,	   with	  hindsight,	   it's	   easy	   to	   see	   that	   a	   strictly	   construed	   notice	   requirement	   had	   the	   effect	   of	  liberating	   many	   copyrights	   from	   their	   authors	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   works'	   publishers.	  	  Notice	  also	  allowed	  the	  law	  to	  tolerate	  completely	  and	  unpredictably	  alienable	  copyrights,	  
                                                           10	  See,	  e.g.,	  Christopher	  Sprigman,	  Reform(aliz)ing	  Copyright,	  57	  Stanford	  L.	  Rev.	  485,	  502-­‐19	  (2004).	  	  11	  See,	  e.g.,	  Sprigman,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  502-­‐19.	  	  12	  See,	  e.g.,	  Daniel	  Gervais	  &	  Dashiell	  Renaud,	  The	  Future	  of	  United	  States	  Copyright	  Formalities:	  	  Why	  We	  Should	  Prioritize	  Recordation,	  28	  Berkeley	  Tech.	  L.	  J.	  1459,	  1460-­‐61	  (2013).	  	  13	  See,	  e.g.,	  Jessica	  Litman,	  Sharing	  &	  Stealing,	  26	  Comm/Ent	  1,	  	  14-­‐17,	  20-­‐22	  (2004).	  	  	  14	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  American	  Tobacco	  Co.	  v.	  Werckmeister,	  207	  U.S.	  284,	  294-­‐95	  (1907);	  Mifflin	  v.	  R.H.	  White	  Co.,	  190	  U.S.	  260,	  262-­‐63	  (1903);	  Peter	  Pan	  Fabrics	  v.	  Martin	  Weiner	  Corp.,	  274	  F.2d	  487	  (2d	  Cir.	  1960);	  Osgood	  v.	  AS.	  Aloe	  Instrument,	  83	  F.	  470	  (C.C.	  E.D.	  Mo.	  1897);	  Smith	  v.	  Wilkinson,	  19	  F.	  Supp.	  841(D.	  N.H.	  1937).	  But	  see	  Rosenbach	  v.	  Dreyfuss,	  2	  F.	  217	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1880)(“The	  purpose	  of	  [a	  provision	  penalizing	  false	  copyright	  notice]	  	  seems	  to	  be	  to	  protect	  persons	  entitled	  to	  copyrights	  from	  their	  privilege	  being	  impaired,	  cheapened,	  and	  lessened	  in	  value	  by	  the	  unauthorized	  assumption	  of	  the	  privilege	  by	  persons	  not	  entitled	  thereto”).	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since	  prospective	  licensees	  could	  always	  find	  out	  who	  the	  copyright	  owner	  was	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  notice.15	  	  	  	  	   Copyright	   commentary	   tends	   to	   describe	   the	   alienable	   property	   characteristics	   of	  American	  copyright	  as	  reflecting	  the	  United	  States's	  fundamentally	  utilitarian	  approach	  to	  copyright.16	  	  Maybe.	  	  Alternatively,	  perhaps	  the	  promiscuous	  alienability	  of	  U.S.	  copyrights	  is	   an	   accidental	   development	   that	   derived	   from	   courts'	   constructions	   of	   the	   copyright	  notice	   provision.	   	   It	   appears	   in	   any	   event	   that	   some	   aspects	   of	   copyright's	   alienability	  reflect	  a	  story	  of	  path	  dependence.	  	  Because	  copyright	  law	  required	  notice,	  other	  doctrinal	  developments	  were	  shaped	  by	  and	  distorted	  by	  that	  requirement.	  	  	  	  	   In	  1989,	  we	  abandoned	  any	  reliance	  on	  copyright	  notice.17	  	  We	  did	  not,	  though,	  think	  about	   ways	   to	   retrofit	   our	   law	   to	   replace	   the	   supports	   that	   notice	   provided	   for	   its	  underlying	  assumptions.	  The	  distortions	  that	  notice	  encouraged	  continue	  to	  shape	  case	  law	  adjudicating	   ownership	   of	   U.S.	   copyrights,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   no	   longer	   make	  practical	  or	  legal	  sense.18	  	  	  	  
	   I.	  Background	  	  	   Let's	   start	  with	   a	   brief	   and	   summary	   chronology:	   	  During	   the	  18th	   Century,	   crown	  
                                                           15	  See,	  e.g.,	  American	  Tobacco	  Co.	  v.	  Werckmeister,	  207	  U.S.	  284,	  293-­‐94	  (1907).	  In	  today's	  post-­‐notice	  realm,	  it	  is	  difficult	  and	  often	  impossible	  to	  discover	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  owners	  of	  the	  copyright	  in	  a	  work.	  	  See	  United	  States	  Copyright	  Office,	  Orphan	  Works	  and	  Mass	  Digitization:	  	  A	  Report	  of	  the	  Register	  of	  Copyrights	  2,	  9-­‐11,	  35-­‐37	  (2015).	  	  The	  adoption	  of	  unconstrained	  divisibility	  of	  copyright,	  which	  allows	  any	  splinter	  of	  an	  exclusive	  right	  to	  be	  separately	  owned	  and	  conveyed,	  has	  greatly	  aggravated	  the	  problem.	  See	  infra	  notes	  126,	  133-­‐138,	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  	  16	  See,	  e.g.,	  Neil	  Netanel,	  	  Alienability	  Restrictions	  and	  Enhancement	  of	  Author	  Autonomy	  in	  United	  States	  and	  Continental	  Copyright	  Law,	  	  12	  Cardozo	  Arts	  &	  Ent.	  L.J.	  1,	  9-­‐13	  (1994).	  	  17	  Berne	  Convention	  Implementation	  Act,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  100-­‐568,	  102	  Stat.	  2853	  §	  7	  (1988),	  codified	  at	  17	  U.S.C.	  §§	  401,	  402.	  	  18	  See,	  e.g.,	  16	  Casa	  Duse	  v.	  Merkin,	  791	  F.3d	  247	  (2d	  Cir.	  2015);	  	  Marvel	  Characters,	  Inc.	  v.	  Kirby,	  726	  F.	  3d	  119	  (2d	  Cir.	  2013).	  	  
4
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 122 [2015]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/122
 5 Draft 10/03/15 
printing	  privileges	  evolved	   into	  statutory	  copyright.19	   In	  England,	  Parliament	  enacted	  the	  Statute	   of	   Anne,	   which	   made	   exclusive	   printing	   privileges	   available	   to	   the	   authors	   of	  published	   books	   and	   their	   assigns,	   on	   registration	   of	   the	   title	   	   with	   the	   	   Stationer's	  Company.20	   	   The	   statute	   defined	   infringement	   as	   the	   act	   or	   printing,	   reprinting,	   or	  importing	   a	   registered	   book	   or	   causing	   a	   book	   to	   be	   printed,	   reprinted	   or	   imported,	  “without	   the	   Consent	   of	   the	   Proprietor	   or	   Proprietors	   thereof	   first	   had	   and	   obtained	   in	  Writing,	   Signed	   in	   the	   Presence	   of	   Two	   or	  more	   Credible	  Witnesses...”21	   	   	   British	   courts	  would	   construe	   that	   language	   to	   require	   that	   any	   copyright	   assignment,	   before	   or	   after	  publication,	  be	  in	  writing.22	  Publishers	  who	  could	  not	  produce	  a	  written	  assignment	  of	  the	  author's	  copyright	  were	  deemed	  to	  own	  no	  copyright	  in	  the	  works	  they	  claimed.23	  	  	   In	  1790,	  the	  United	  States	  enacted	  its	  first	  federal	  copyright	  act,	  enabling	  authors	  of	  published	   books,	  maps,	   or	   charts	  who	  were	   U.S.	   citizens	   or	   residents	   to	   secure	   the	   sole	  right	   to	  print,	   reprint,	   publish	  and	  vend	   the	  work	  by	   recording	   the	   title	  of	   the	  work	  and	  depositing	  a	  printed	  copy	  of	   the	   title	   in	   the	  office	  of	   the	  clerk	  of	   the	  district	  court	  before	  publication,	  causing	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  record	  to	  be	  published	  in	  a	  newspaper,	  and	  delivering	  a	  copy	   of	   the	   published	  work	   to	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	  within	   six	  months	   of	   publication.24	  	  The	  American	  statute	  defined	  infringement	  in	  	  language	  imported	  from	  the	  Statute	  of	  Anne,	  as	  encompassing	  printing,	  reprinting,	  publishing,	  or	  importing	  any	  copy	  or	  copies	  “without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  author	  or	  proprietor	  thereof,	  first	  had	  and	  obtained	  in	  writing,	  signed	  in	  
                                                           19	  See	  generally	  Isabella	  Alexander,	  Copyright	  Law	  and	  the	  Public	  Interest	  in	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century	  17-­‐40	  (2010).	  	  20	  8	  Anne	  c.	  19.	  	  The	  statute	  also	  obliged	  the	  author	  or	  assign	  to	  deposit	  copies	  for	  the	  use	  of	  libraries.	  	  21	  Id.	  Parliament	  repealed	  the	  two	  witness	  requirement	  in	  1814.	  	  	  See	  Copyright	  Act,	  London	  (1814),	  Primary	  Sources	  on	  Copyright	  (1450-­‐1900),	  eds	  L.	  Bently	  &	  M.	  Kretschmer,	  www.copyrighthistory.org;	  Cumberland	  v.	  Copeland,	  	  158	  Eng.	  Rep.	  80	  (1862).	  	  22	  E.g.,	  Power	  v.	  Walker,	  3	  M.	  &	  S.	  7,	  111	  Eng.	  Rep.	  3	  (1814);	  see	  Peter	  Burke,	  A	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Copyright	  19-­‐21	  (1842).	  	  23	  E.g,	  Clementi	  v.	  Walker,	  2	  B.	  &	  C.	  861	  (1824)(alternate	  ground).	  	  24	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1790,	  1	  Stat.	  124,	  1st	  Cong.	  2d	  Sess	  (1790).	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the	  presence	  of	  two	  or	  more	  credible	  witnesses.”25	  That	  language	  would	  remain	  in	  United	  States	  copyright	  statutes	  through	  several	  major	  revisions,26	  finally	  disappearing	  in	  1909.	  	  	   In	  1802,	  Congress	  added	  a	  requirement	  that	  the	  author	  or	  proprietor	  insert	  a	  notice	  of	   copyright	   on	   the	   title	   page	   of	   any	   book	   or	   the	   face	   of	   any	   map	   or	   chart.27	   The	  requirement	  made	   particular	   sense	   in	   a	  market	   in	  which	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   published	  books,	   maps,	   and	   charts	   were	   unprotected	   by	   copyright.28	   The	   question	   whether	   the	  statutory	   provisions	   imposed	   strict	   preconditions	   to	   copyright	   protection	   or	   simply	  mandated	   	  obligations	   that	  might	  be	  excused	   came	  before	  a	   federal	   court	   in	  1824	   in	   the	  case	   of	   Ewer	   v.	   Coxe.29	   Charles	   Ewer,	   the	   publisher	   of	   the	   Pharmacopoeia	   of	   the	   United	  
States	  of	  America	   filed	  suit	   to	  enjoin	   the	  publication	  of	  a	  competing	  drug	  reference	  book,	  claiming	  that	  it	  infringed	  his	  copyright.	  	  Ewer	  had	  registered	  the	  title	  of	  the	  book,	  and	  had	  printed	  a	  copyright	  notice	  on	  the	  page	  after	  the	  title	  page	  of	  every	  copy	  of	  the	  book,	  but	  had	  failed	   to	  publish	  a	   copy	  of	   the	   registration	  record	   in	  any	  newspaper.	  The	  court	  held	   that	  Ewer	  had	   failed	   to	   secure	  a	   copyright	   in	   the	  Pharmacopoeia.30	  The	   language	  of	   the	  1802	  Act,	  the	  court	  concluded,	  admitted	  of	  no	  other	  construction	  than	  that	  all	  four	  requirements,	  registration	  and	  deposit	  of	  a	  printed	  copy	  with	   the	  court	  clerk,	  newspaper	  publication	  of	  the	   record,	   transmission	   of	   a	   copy	   of	   the	   published	  work	   to	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State,	   and	  
                                                           25	  Id.	  §	  	  2.	  	  	  	  26	  See,	  e.g.,	  Act.	  Of	  February	  3,	  1831,	  §	  §	  6,	  7,	  	  	  21st	  Cong.	  2d	  Sess.	  (1831);	  Rev.	  Stat.	  §	  §	  4964,	  4965.	  	  27	  Act	  of	  April	  29,	  1802,	  2	  Stat.	  171	  	  (1802).	  The	  Act	  also	  extended	  copyright	  protection	  to	  etchings	  and	  prints.	  	  28	   	  In	  1987,	  historian	  James	  Gilreath	  reported	  that	  of	  15,000	  publications	  between	  1790	  and	  1800,	  researchers	  were	  able	  to	  find	  only	  779	  copyright	  registrations	  for	  the	  period.	  	  JAMES	  GILREATH,	  FEDERAL	  COPYRIGHT	  RECORDS	  1790-­‐1800	  IX	  (1987).	  Since	  works	  by	  foreign	  authors	  were	  categorically	  ineligible	  for	  copyright,	  it	  isn't	  surprising	  that	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  published	  works	  availed	  themselves	  of	  copyright	  protection.	  	  Bill	  Patry	  asserts	  that	  another	  and	  perhaps	  more	  important	  reason	  for	  the	  small	  number	  of	  copyrighted	  books	  was	  that	  publishers	  found	  the	  registration	  and	  deposit	  requirements	  too	  burdensome.	  	  See	  WILLIAM	  F.	  PATRY,	  1	  PATRY	  ON	  COPYRIGHT	  §1.19	  at	  1-­‐223	  –	  1-­‐225	  (2009).	  	  29	  8	  F.	  Cas.	  917	  (C.C.	  E.D.	  Pa.	  1824).	  	  30	  8	  F.	  Cas.	  at	  920.	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printing	  the	  copyright	  notice,	  were	  strict	  prerequisites	  to	  copyright	  protection.31	  	  	   In	  1831,	  Congress	  enacted	  the	  first	  general	  revision	  of	  copyright	  law.32	  The	  revision	  act	   extended	   copyright	   to	   musical	   compositions	   and	   extended	   the	   copyright	   term.	   	   It	  retained	   the	   registration,	   deposit,	   and	   notice	   requirements,	   though,	   and	   continued	   to	  define	   infringement	  as	  printing	  or	  publishing	  a	  work	  without	  having	  secured	   the	  written	  consent	   of	   the	   copyright	   owner	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   two	   witnesses.33	   In	   1834,	   Congress	  amended	  the	  copyright	  act	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  recordation	  of	  copyright	  assignments.34	  	  
                                                           31	  Id.	  at	  919.	  	  32	  Act	  of	  Feb.	  3,	  1831,	  21st	  Cong.,	  2d	  Sess.	  (1831).	  	  	  	  33	  Id	  at	  §§	  6,	  7,	  9.	  	  34	  Act	  of	  	  June	  30,	  1834,	  	  4	  Stat.	  728	  	  (1834):	  	   	  	  That	  all	  deeds	  or	   instruments	   in	  writing	  for	  the	  transfer	  or	  assignment	  of	  copyrights,	  being	  proved	  and	  acknowledged	  in	  such	  manner	  as	  deeds	  for	  the	  conveyance	  of	  land	  are	  required	  by	  law	  to	  be	  proved	  or	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  same	  State	  or	  district,	  shall	  and	  may	  be	  recorded	  in	  the	  office	  where	  the	  original	  copyright	  is	  deposited	  and	  recorded...	  	  In	  1870,	  Congress	  enacted	  another	  general	  revision	  of	  copyright.	  	  Act	  of	  July	  8,	  1870	  to	  Revise,	  Consolidate	  and	  Amend	  the	  Statutes	  Relating	  to	  Patents	  and	  Copyrights,	  41st	  Cong.	  2d	  Sess.,	  16	  Stat.	  198	  (1870).	  Section	  88	  of	  the	  Act	  provided:	  That	  copyrights	  shall	  be	  assignable	  in	  law,	  by	  any	  instrument	  of	  writing,	  and	  such	  assignment	  shall	  be	  recorded	  in	  the	  office	  of	   the	  Librarian	  of	  Congress	  within	  sixty	  days	  after	   its	  execution,	   in	  default	  of	  which	   it	   shall	  be	  void	  as	  against	  any	  subsequent	  purchaser	  or	  mortgagee	   for	  a	  valuable	  consideration,	  without	  notice.	  	   In	  Fred	  Fisher	  Music	  v.	  M.	  Witmark	  &	  Sons,	  318	  U.S.	  643,	  658	  (1943),	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  predicated	  its	  conclusion	  that	  renewal	  terms	  were	  assignable	  on	  a	  comparison	  between	  the	  copyright	  office	  records	  of	  renewal	  term	  assignments	  before	  and	  after	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  1909	  Act.	  	  This	  was	  appropriate,	  the	  Court	  said,	  because	  “[s]ince	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1870,	  16	  Stat.	  198,	  213,	  assignments	  of	  copyrights	  must	  be	  recorded	  in	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Register	  of	  Copyrights.”	  Id.	  at	  658.	  	  Lower	  courts	  before	  and	  after	  this	  case,	  however,	  construed	  the	  recordation	  requirement	  to	  permit	  enforcement	  of	  unrecorded	  assigned	  copyrights	  unless	  infringers	  were	  bona	  fide	  purchasers	  without	  notice.	  	  E.g.,	  New	  Fiction	  Publishing	  v,	  Starr,	  220	  F.	  994	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1915);	  Photo	  Drama	  Motion	  Picture	  v.	  Social	  Uplift	  Film,	  213	  F.	  374	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1914)	  affd	  220	  F	  448	  (2d	  Cir	  1915).	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   Henry	  Wheaton	   had	   been	   the	   reporter	   for	   Supreme	  Court	   decisions	   from	  1816	   to	  1827.	   	  When	  his	  successor,	  Richard	  Peters,	  announced	  that	  he	  would	  be	  republishing	  the	  judicial	   decisions	   that	  Wheaton	  had	   reported,	  Wheaton	   sued	   for	   copyright	   infringement.	  	  Peters	  argued	  that	  Wheaton	  had	  failed	  to	  secure	  a	  copyright	  on	  his	  reports,	  because	  he	  had	  neglected	  to	  deliver	  copies	  of	  the	  volumes	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State.	  	  Wheaton	  insisted	  that	  even	  if	  he	  had	  failed	  to	  comply	  scrupulously	  with	  the	  copyright	  statute's	  requirements,	  he	  was	  entitled	  to	  an	  injunction	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  common	  law	  copyright,	  arising	  from	  natural	  law.35	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  rejected	  the	  principle	  that	  authors	  had	  a	  perpetual	  common	  law	  copyright,	   holding	   that	   copyrights	   in	   published	  work	  were	   available	   only	   as	   a	  matter	   of	  statutory	  law.	   	   	  Any	  common	  law	  rights	   in	  an	  unpublished	  manuscript	  did	  not	  survive	  its	  publication. That	  an	  author,	  at	  common	  law,	  has	  a	  property	  in	  his	  manuscript,	  and	  may	   obtain	   redress	   against	   any	   one	   who	   deprives	   him	   of	   it,	   or	   by	  improperly	   obtaining	   a	   copy	   endeavours	   to	   realise	   a	   profit	   by	   its	  publication,	   cannot	  be	  doubted;	  but	   this	   is	   a	   very	  different	   right	   from	  that	   which	   asserts	   a	   perpetual	   and	   exclusive	   property	   in	   the	   future	  publication	  of	  the	  work,	  after	  the	  author	  shall	  have	  published	  it	  to	  the	  world.36	  The	   Court	   construed	   the	   copyright	   laws	   to	   require	   strict	   compliance	   with	   all	   of	   the	  statutory	  conditions	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  federal	  copyright	  protection.37 The	  acts	  required	  to	  be	  done	  by	  an	  author,	  to	  secure	  his	  right,	  are	  in	  the	  order	  in	  which	  they	  must	  naturally	  transpire.	  First,	  the	  title	  of	  the	  book	  
                                                           35	  See	   generally	  Howard	  B.	   Abrams,	   	   The	  Historic	   Foundation	   of	   American	  Copyright	   Law:	   	   Exploding	   the	  Myth	   of	  Common	  Law	  Copyright,	  29	  Wayne.	  L.	  Rev.	  1119,	  1178-­‐	  87	  (1983);	  Craig	  Joyce,	  The	  Story	  of	  Wheaton	  v.	  Peters:	  	  A	  
Curious	   Chapter	   in	   the	   History	   of	   Judicature,	   in	   JANE	   C.	   GINSBURG	   AND	   ROCHELLE	   COOPER	   DREYFUSS,	   INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  STORIES	  36	  (2006).	  	  36	  Wheaton	  v.	  Peters,	  33	  U.S.	  591,	  657	  (1831).	  It's	  unclear	  from	  a	  21st	  century	  vantage	  point	  whether	  the	  Court's	  reference	  to	  a	  common	  law	  “property	  in	  his	  manuscript”	  refers	  to	  the	  author's	  ownership	  of	  the	  tangible	  copy	  embodied	  in	  the	  manuscript	  or	  to	  literary	  property	  in	  the	  manuscript's	  contents.	  	  See,	  e.g,	  	  Wendy	  Gordon,	  The	  Core	  of	  Copyright:	  	  Authors,	  Not	  Publishers,	  52	  Houston	  L.	  Rev.	  	  613,	  620	  n.	  15	  (2014);	  Ronan	  Deazley,	  	  Capitol	  Records	  v.	  Naxos	  of	  America	  (2005):	  	  Just	  Another	  Footnote	  in	  the	  History	  of	  Copyright?,	  53	  J.	  Copyright	  Soc'y	  23,	  62-­‐63(2005).	  	  37	  Id.	  at	  665-­‐68.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Baker	  v.	  Taylor.	  2	  F.	  Cas.	  478,	  478-­‐79	  (C.C.S.D.N.Y.	  1848)(holding	  the	  copyright	  invalid	  because	  of	  a	  failure	  to	  print	  the	  correct	  date	  in	  the	  copyright	  notice).	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is	   to	   be	   deposited	   with	   the	   clerk,	   and	   the	   record	   he	   makes	   must	   be	  inserted	   in	   the	   first	   or	   second	   page;	   then	   the	   public	   notice	   in	   the	  newspapers	  is	  to	  be	  given;	  and	  within	  six	  months	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  book,	  a	  copy	  must	  be	  deposited	  in	  the	  department	  of	  state.38	  The	  Court	   remanded	   the	   case	   to	   the	   lower	   court	   to	  permit	   a	   jury	   to	  determine	  whether	  Henry	  Wheaton	  or	  his	  publisher	  had	  in	  fact	  complied	  with	  all	  of	  the	  statutory	  conditions.39	  	  	  	   II.	  19th	  century	  Assignments	  of	  copyright	  ...and	  other	  transfers	  
	  	   By	   the	   middle	   of	   the	   19th	   century,	   then,	   the	   federal	   copyright	   statute	   afforded	  copyright	   only	   to	  published	  works.40	   	   It	   required	  deposit	   before	  publication	  of	   a	   printed	  copy	  of	  the	  work's	  title	  with	  the	  clerk	  of	  the	  local	  district	  court,	  printing	  of	  copyright	  notice	  on	  the	  title	  page	  or	  the	  page	  following	  the	  title	  page,	  and	  delivery	  of	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  published	  work	  within	  three	  months	  to	  the	  clerk	  of	  the	  court,	  who	  was	  commanded	  to	  send	  it	  on	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State.41	  	  	  U.S.	  courts	  had	  concluded	  	  that	  copyright	  protection	  was	  available	  only	  after	  careful	  compliance	  with	  the	  statutory	  conditions.42	  	  The	  statute	  also	  commanded	  that	  copyright	  assignments	  be	  recorded,43	  and	  contained	   language	  that	  had	  been	  read	  by	  British	   courts	   to	   invalidate	   any	   assignment	   of	   copyright	   in	   a	   published	   or	   unpublished	  
                                                           38	  33	  U.S.	  at	  664.	  	  39	  Id.	  at	  667-­‐68.	  	  The	  majority	  opinion	  also	  noted	  in	  passing	  that	  all	  of	  the	  Justices	  were	  “unanimously	  of	  	  opinion	  that	  no	  reporter	  has	  or	  can	  have	  any	  copyright	  in	  the	  written	  opinions	  delivered	  by	  this	  court;	  and	  that	  the	  judges	  thereof	  cannot	  confer	  on	  any	  reporter	  any	  such	  right.”	  	  Id.	  at	  668.	  	  	  40	  Although	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  “publication”	  was	  contested,	  the	  weight	  of	  authority	  defined	  it	  as	  the	  distribution	  of	  copies	  of	  a	  work	  to	  the	  public.	  See	  William	  S.	  Strauss,	  	  Study	  No.	  29:	  Protection	  of	  Unpublished	  Works	  	  5-­‐15,	  Studies	  on	  Copyright	  (1957).	  	  In	  1976,	  Congress	  added	  a	  definition	  of	  “publication”	  to	  the	  copyright	  statute.	  	  See	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  101.	  	  41	  Act	  of	  Feb.	  3,	  1831	  §§	  4,	  5.	  	  42	  E.g.,	  Wheaton	  v.	  Peters,	  	  33	  U.S.	  591	  (1831);	  Baker	  v.	  Taylor,	  2	  F.	  Cas	  478	  (C.C.	  S.D.N.Y.	  1848);	  Ewer	  v.	  Coxe,	  8	  F.	  Cas.	  917	  (C.C.	  E.D.	  Pa.	  1824).	  	  43	  Act	  of	  	  June	  30,	  1834	  §	  1.	  	  
9
Litman:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2015
 10 Draft 10/03/15 
work	  unless	  that	  assignment	  were	  in	  writing.44	  	  Did	  the	  requirement	  for	  strict	  compliance	  with	   statutory	   terms	   apply	   either	   to	   the	   provision	   requiring	   copyright	   assignments	   and	  licenses	  to	  be	  in	  writing,	  or	  to	  the	  command	  that	  written	  assignments	  “shall	  and	  may”	  be	  recorded?	  	  Mid-­‐19th	  century	  copyright	  experts	  were	  unsure.	  	  	   In	  1847,	  Boston	   lawyer	  George	  Ticknor	  Curtis	  published	  his	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  
Copyright.45	   Curtis	   characterized	   the	   question	  whether	   unwritten	   copyright	   assignments	  were	  void	  as	  “a	  point	  admitting	  of	  great	  doubt.”46	  Curtis	  noted	  that	  British	  cases	  had	  read	  similar	   language	   to	   permit	   only	   written	   assignments	   of	   copyright	   in	   published	   or	  unpublished	  works.47	  The	  1834	  amendment	  to	  the	  U.S.	  copyright	  law,	  Curtis	  wrote,	  “seems	  to	  recognize	   the	  doctrine,	   that	   	   transfers	  or	  copyright	  must	  be	   in	  writing,	  but	   it	  does	  not	  expressly	  declare	  that	  they	  shall	  be	  so.”48	  	   	  	   Five	  years	  later,	  that	  question	  arose	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Pulte	  v.	  Derby.49	  	  	  Dr.	  Pulte	  signed	  an	  agreement	   to	   give	  publisher	  H.W.	  Derby	  &	  Company	   “the	   exclusive	   right	   to	  print	   and	  publish	   an	   edition	   of	   one	   thousand	   copies”	   of	   a	   book	   to	   be	   written	   by	   Pulte	   titled	  “Homeopathic	   Domestic	   Physician,”50	   in	   return	   for	   a	   royalty	   of	   15¢	   per	   copy	   sold.	   	   The	  
                                                           44	  	  Act	  of	  Feb.	  3,	  1831	  §§	  7,	  9.	  	  See	  e.g.,	  Clementi	  v.	  Walker,	  2	  B.	  &	  C.	  861	  (1824);	  Power	  v	  Walker	  3	  M.	  &	  S.	  7,	  111	  Eng.	  Rep.	  3	  	  (1814)	  	  45	  GEORGE	  TICKNOR	  CURTIS,	  A	  TREATISE	  ON	  THE	  LAW	  OF	  COPYRIGHT	  IN	  BOOKS,	  DRAMATIC	  AND	  MUSICAL	  COMPOSITIONS,	  LETTERS	  AND	  OTHER	  MANUSCRIPTS,	  ENGRAVINGS,	  AND	  SCULPTURE	  AS	  ENACTED	  AND	  ADMINISTERED	  IN	  	  ENGLAND	  AND	  AMERICA	  (1847).	  Curtis's	  treatise	  is	  commonly	  described	  as	  the	  first	  American	  treatise	  on	  copyright	  law.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Oren	  Bracha,	  ‘Commentary	  on	  George	  Ticknor	  Curtis's	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Copyright	  (1847)',	  in	  Primary	  Sources	  on	  Copyright	  
(1450-­1900),	  eds	  L.	  Bently	  &	  M.	  Kretschmer,	  www.copyrighthistory.org	  (2008).	  	  46	  Curtis,	  supra	  note	  45,	  at	  220.	  	  47	  Id.	  at	  233-­‐34.	  	  See.	  e.g.,	  Clementi	  v.	  Walker,	  2	  B.	  &	  C.	  861	  (1824).	  	  48	  Curtis,	  supra	  note	  45,	  at	  233.	  	  49	  20	  F.	  Cas.	  51	  (C.C.	  D.	  Ohio	  1852).	  	  50	  J.H.	  PULTE,	  HOMEOPATHIC	  DOMESTIC	  PHYSICIAN	  CONTAINING	  THE	  TREATMENT	  OF	  DISEASES,	  WITH	  POPULAR	  EXPLANATIONS	  ON	  ANATOMY,	  PHYSIOLOGY,	  HYGIENE,	  AND	  HYDROPATHY	  (1850).	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agreement	  gave	  Derby	  the	  option	  to	  print	  a	  second	  edition	  in	  return	  for	  a	  royalty	  of	  20¢	  per	  copy.	   	   After	   the	   success	   of	   the	   second	   edition,	   the	   publisher	   sought	   to	   publish	   another	  edition.	   Dr.	   Pulte	   objected	   that	   he	   had	   not	   authorized	   any	   editions	   beyond	   the	   second	  printing	   and	   sued	   to	   enjoin	   Derby	   from	   infringing	   his	   copyright.	   	   Derby	   countersued,	  insisting	  that	   it	  owned	  the	  copyright	  and	  seeking	  an	   injunction	  to	  prevent	  Dr.	  Pulte	   from	  publishing	  his	  own	  edition	  of	  the	  book.	  	  	  	  	   The	  Circuit	  Court	  for	  the	  District	  of	  Ohio	  concluded	  that	  the	  written	  agreement	  did	  not	   itself	   convey	   Dr.	   Pulte's	   copyright	   to	   Derby	   because	   Dr.	   Pulte	   did	   not	   yet	   have	   a	  copyright	  at	  the	  time	  he	  signed	  the	  agreement:	  	  	  	   The	   agreement	   between	   the	   parties	   does	   not	   purport	   to	   convey	   the	  copyright.	  At	  the	  time	  it	  was	  entered	  into	  no	  copyright	  had	  been	  secured;	  and	  there	   is	   no	   provision	   in	   the	   agreement,	   by	   whom	   it	   was	   to	   be	   acquired	   in	  future.	  The	  contract	  embraced	  only	  the	  printing	  and	  publication	  of	  the	  work,	  on	   the	   terms	   stated.	   It	   gave	   the	   defendants	   the	   exclusive	   right	   to	   print	   and	  publish	   an	   edition	   of	   one	   thousand	   copies;	   and	   should	   a	   second	   edition	   be	  called	   for,	   the	   complainant	  was	   to	   revise	   and	   correct	   the	   first	   one,	   and	   the	  defendants	  were	  to	  prepare	  stereotype	  plates,	  and	  to	  print	  as	  many	  copies,	  on	  the	  terms	  stated,	  as	  "they	  can	  sell."	  We	  must	   look	  out	  of	   the	  contract,	   to	  the	  acts	   of	   the	   parties,	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   copyright.	   And	   these	   facts	   must,	  necessarily,	  have	  a	  strong	  bearing	  upon	  the	  contract.	  It	  will	  tend	  to	  show	  how	  it	  was	  understood	  and	  construed	  by	  the	  parties	  to	  it.	  It	  may	  be	  observed	  that	  in	  making	  a	  mere	  contract	  for	  printing	  and	  publishing	  a	  work,	  it	  is	  not	  usual	  to	  say	  any	  thing	  about	  the	  copyright.	  That	  is	  ordinarily	  retained	  by	  the	  author,	  unless	   there	   be	   an	   agreement	   or	   understanding,	   that	   the	   name	   of	   the	  publisher	  shall	  be	  used	  for	  that	  purpose.	  We	  must	  then	  look	  at	  the	  book	  itself,	  and	  to	   the	  appropriate	  records,	   to	  see	   in	  whom	  the	  copyright	   is	  vested.	  The	  evidence	  of	  this	  right	  must	  appear	  on	  the	  second	  page	  of	  the	  book	  published,	  it	  must	  be	  entered	  in	  the	  records	  of	  the	  clerk	  of	  the	  district	  court	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  copies	  must	  be	  deposited	  in	  the	  department	  of	  state	  of	  the	  United	   States,	   the	   Smithsonian	   Institute,	   and	   the	   Congressional	   Library.	  Until	   these	  things	  are	  done,	   the	  copyright	   is	  not	  perfect;	  although,	  by	  taking	  the	   incipient	   step,	   a	   right	   is	   acquired,	  which	   chancery	  will	  protect,	  until	   the	  other	  acts	  may	  be	  done.51	  	  Looking	  outside	  the	  contract	   to	  the	  acts	  of	   the	  parties,	   the	  court	  concluded	  that	  Dr.	  Pulte	  
                                                                                                                                                                                                             	  51	  20	  F.	  Cas.	  	  at	  51-­‐52.	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had	  in	  fact	  authorized	  Derby	  to	  secure	  the	  copyright	  on	  its	  own	  behalf:	  	  When	  the	  agreement	  was	  entered	  into,	  the	  complainant	  had	  no	  copyright	  to	  convey.	  …	  It	  was	  the	   interest	  of	  both	  parties	   to	  have	  the	  copyright	  secured.	  Without	  this,	  the	  first	  publication	  of	  it	  would	  have	  abandoned	  it	  to	  the	  public,	  and	  consequently,	  it	  could	  have	  been	  of	  no	  more	  value	  to	  either	  party	  than	  to	  any	  other	  publishers	  or	  authors,	  who	  might	  choose	  to	  revise	  and	  republish	  it.	  The	   defendants,	   it	   appears,	   secured	   to	   themselves	   the	   copyright.	   And	   the	  evidence	  of	  that	  right	  was	  published	  on	  the	  second	  page	  of	  the	  book,	  which	  was	  under	  the	  eye	  of	  the	  complainant.	  He,	  therefore,	  sanctioned	  it.52	  	  	  Since	  the	  notice	  and	  certificate	  of	  registration	  were	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  publisher,	  the	  court	  reasoned,	  the	  publisher	  must	  be	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  copyright.	  	  The	  author's	  failure	  to	  assign	  his	  copyright	  in	  writing	  didn't	  undermine	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  transfer	  because,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  agreement,	  he	  had	  not	  yet	  secured	  federal	  statutory	  copyright	  protection.	  	  	  	   Henry	  Wheaton,	   in	   addition	   to	   being	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   reporter	   at	   the	   center	   of	  
Wheaton	   v.	   Peters,53	   authored	   an	   influential	   international	   law	   treatise.54	  After	  Wheaton's	  death	   in	   1848,	   his	  widow,	   Catherine	  Wheaton,	   consulted	   her	   late	   husband's	   friend,	  W.B.	  Lawrence,	   who	   had	   done	   some	   work	   for	   Wheaton	   on	   a	   revised	   edition	   of	   the	   treatise.	  	  Catherine	   asked	   Lawrence	   to	   edit	   a	   new	   edition	   of	   the	   treatise,	   which	   he	   agreed	   to	   do.	  	  Lawrence	  updated	  and	  annotated	  the	  treatise.	  	  It	  was	  published	  in	  1855	  by	  Little	  Brown	  as	  “Elements	   of	   International	   Law	   by	   Henry	   Wheaton,	   Sixth	   Edition	   by	   William	   Beach	  Lawrence.”55	  The	  copyright	  in	  the	  6th	  edition	  was	  registered	  in	  Catherine's	  name	  and	  Little	  
                                                           52	  Id.	  at	  52.	  The	  court	  concluded	  that	  the	  action	  arose	  under	  a	  contract	  rather	  than	  the	  copyright	  law	  and	  that	  the	  federal	  court	  therefore	  lacked	  jurisdiction	  to	  enter	  an	  injunction	  against	  either	  party.	  	  It	  recommended,	  however,	  that	  the	  author	  agree	  to	  revise	  and	  improve	  the	  manuscript,	  in	  return	  for	  which	  	  publisher	  would	  pay	  the	  author	  a	  more	  generous	  royalty	  for	  subsequent	  editions.	  	  Id.	  at	  53.	  	  53	  33	  U.S.	  591	  (1831).	  	  54	  HENRY	  WHEATON,	  ELEMENTS	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (1836).	  The	  copyright	  was	  registered	  in	  the	  publisher's	  name,	  and	  the	  notice	  accordingly	  named	  the	  publisher.	  	  Wheaton	  published	  	  three	  revised	  editions	  before	  his	  death	  in	  1848.	  	  55	  HENRY	  WHEATON	  &	  WILLIAM	  BEACH	  LAWRENCE,	  ELEMENTS	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (6th	  ed.	  1855).	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Brown	  put	  her	  name	  in	  the	  copyright	  notice.56	   	  At	  Catherine's	  request,	  Lawrence	  edited	  a	  seventh	  edition,	  published	  in	  1863,	  and	  copyrighted	  in	  Catherine's	  name.57	  	  	   In	   1866	   Catherine	   died.	   	   Her	   daughter,	   Martha	   Wheaton,	   was	   dissatisfied	   with	  Lawrence's	  work,	  and	  she	  and	  Little	  Brown	  engaged	  Richard	  Henry	  Dana,	  Jr.,	  to	  prepare	  an	  eighth	   edition	   of	   the	   treatise.58	   Lawrence	   filed	   suit	   for	   copyright	   infringement.59	   	   	   	   He	  alleged	   that	   he	   had	   agreed	   to	   furnish	   his	   services	   for	   no	   pay	   on	   the	   understanding	   that	  while	  Catherine	  would	  hold	  the	   formal	  title	   to	  the	  copyright	  and	  would	  be	  paid	  all	  of	   the	  proceeds	  of	  the	  revised	  editions,	  she	  would	  not	  use	  his	  additions	  and	  annotations	  without	  his	   written	   consent.	   	   Catherine,	   moreover,	   had	   authorized	   Lawrence	   to	   reuse	   his	  contributions	  in	  any	  way	  that	  he	  wished.	   	  Although	  Dana	  denied	  having	  incorporated	  any	  of	   Lawrence's	   contributions	   into	   his	   edition,	   Lawrence	   identified	   multiple	   incidents	   of	  copying.60	   	  Dana	  argued	  that	  the	  copyrights	  on	  Lawrence's	  two	  editions	  of	  Wheaton	  were	  void,	   because	   Lawrence	   never	   assigned	   his	   copyright	   in	   writing	   to	   Catherine,	   and	   thus	  registration	  and	  notice	  had	  been	  made	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  wrong	  person.61	  	  	  The	   court	   concluded	   that	   because	   Lawrence	   wished	   to	   render	   his	   services	   to	  Catherine	  at	  no	  charge,	  so	  that	  she	  could	  profit	  from	  further	  editions	  of	  her	  late	  husband's	  treatise,	  Lawrence's	  contributions	  vested	  in	  Catherine	  as	  an	  initial	  matter: Although	   the	   services	   were	   gratuitous,	   the	   contributions	   of	   the	  
                                                           56	  See	  id.	  at	  the	  page	  following	  the	  title	  page.	  	  57	  HENRY	  WHEATON	  &	  WILLIAM	  BEACH	  LAWRENCE,	  LAWRENCE'S	  WHEATON:	  ELEMENTS	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (2d	  annotated	  ed.	  1863).	  The	  page	  after	  the	  title	  page	  included	  two	  copyright	  notices	  in	  Catherine's	  name:	  	  one	  for	  the	  1855	  edition	  and	  the	  second	  for	  the	  1863	  edition.	  	  58	  HENRY	  WHEATON	  &	  RICHARD	  HENRY	  DANA,	  JR.,	  ELEMENTS	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (8th	  ed.	  1866).	  The	  page	  following	  the	  title	  page	  of	  the	  8th	  edition	  contained	  three	  copyright	  notices:	  	  the	  1855	  and	  1863	  notice	  in	  Catherine's	  name,	  and	  a	  1866	  notice	  in	  Martha's	  name.	  	  59	  Lawrence	  v.	  Dana,	  15	  F.	  Cas.	  26	  (C.C.DMass	  1869).	  	  60	  See	  15	  F.	  Cas.	  at	  52-­‐63.	  	  61	  See	  15	  F.	  Cas.	  at	  50.	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complainant	  became	  the	  property	  of	   the	  proprietor	  of	   the	  book,	  as	   the	  work	  was	  done,	  just	  as	  effectually	  as	  they	  would	  if	  the	  complainant	  had	  been	  paid	  daily	  an	  agreed	  price	  for	  his	  labor.	  He	  gave	  the	  contributions	  to	  the	  proprietor	  for	  those	  two	  editions	  of	  the	  work,	  and	  the	  title	  to	  the	  same	  vested	  in	  the	  proprietor,	  as	  the	  work	  was	  done,	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  gift,	  and	  subject	  to	  the	  trust	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  donor,	  as	  necessarily	  implied	  by	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   arrangement....	   The	   title	   and	   property	   of	   the	  contributions	  being	  vested	  in	  Mrs.	  Wheaton,	  she	  would	  not	  acquire	  any	  thing	   by	   an	   assignment	   from	   the	   contributor,	   as	   he	   had	   neither	   the	  immediate	  title	  to	  the	  contributions	  nor	  any	  inchoate	  right	  of	  copyright	  in	   those	   editions.	   He	   could	   not	   assign	   any	   thing,	   because	   he	   owned	  nothing	   in	   praesenti,	   as	   the	   title	   to	   his	   contributions	   and	   the	   inchoate	  right	   of	   copyright	   for	   those	   editions,	   had	   become	   vested	   in	   Mrs.	  Wheaton	  as	  proprietor	  of	  the	  book.	  62	  	  	  	  Having	   rescued	   the	   copyright	   by	   finding	   that	   Lawrence's	   authorship	   vested	  magically	   in	  Catherine	   because	   he	   wished	   it	   to	   be	   so,	   the	   court	   went	   on	   to	   subject	   the	   copyright	   to	  Lawrence's	  claim	  to	  be	  its	  equitable	  owner.63	  	  	  	   Three	   years	   later,	   painter	   Arthur	   Parton	   sued	   lithographer	   and	   publisher	   Louis	  Prang	  for	  copyright	  infringement.	  	  Parton	  had	  painted	  a	  landscape	  and	  sold	  the	  painting	  to	  a	  purchaser,	  who	  resold	  it	  to	  Prang.	  	  Prang	  made	  and	  published	  a	  lithograph	  of	  the	  painting	  and	   registered	   the	   copyright	   in	   the	   name	   of	   his	   firm.	   	   Parton	   argued	   that	   he	   had	   not	  conveyed	   the	   copyright	   to	   his	  work	   by	   selling	   the	   painting	   because	   the	   statute	   required	  copyright	   assignments	   to	   be	  made	   in	  writing	  before	   two	  witnesses.	   	   The	   court	   held	   that	  those	   provisions	   of	   the	   law	   applied	   only	   to	   textual	   manuscripts,	   and	   that	   no	   written	  
                                                           62	  Id.	  at	  51.	  The	  sophisticated	  reader	  may	  be	  wondering	  why	  Lawrence's	  book	  was	  not	  a	  work	  made	  for	  hire.	  	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  	  in	  1869,	  courts	  had	  not	  yet	  invented	  the	  work	  made	  for	  hire	  doctrine.	  	  Copyright	  proprietors	  other	  than	  the	  author	  therefore	  needed	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  they	  had	  legitimately	  acquired	  ownership	  of	  the	  copyright.	  As	  should	  be	  clear	  from	  the	  description	  of	  the	  cases,	  courts	  were	  eager	  to	  accept	  insubstantial	  purported	  evidence	  of	  such	  an	  assignment.	  	  The	  first	  cases	  recognizing	  employer	  ownership	  of	  employee's	  works	  appeared	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  See	  Catherine	  L.	  Fiske,	  Authors	  at	  Work:	  	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Work-­‐For-­‐Hire	  Doctrine,	  15	  Yale	  J.	  L.	  &	  Humanities	  1	  (2003).	  	  	  	  63	  Id.	  at	  53-­‐55:	  As	   the	   proprietor	   of	   the	   book,	   Mrs.	   Wheaton,	   by	   virtue	   of	   that	   arrangement,	   became	   the	   absolute	  owner	   of	   the	  notes	   as	   they	  were	  prepared,	   so	   far	   as	   respects	   the	   editions	   in	   question;	   and	   she	   also	  acquired	  therewith	  the	  right	  to	  copyright	  the	  same	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  property;	  but	  she	  did	  not	  acquire	  thereby	  any	  right	  or	  title,	  legal	  or	  equitable,	  to	  use	  the	  notes	  in	  a	  third	  edition	  of	  the	  annotated	  work,	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  complainant.	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assignment	  was	  required	  to	  transfer	  the	  copyright	  in	  an	  unpublished	  painting.64 Beyond	  doubt,	  the	  right	  of	  first	  publication	  is	  vested	  in	  the	  author;	  but	  he	  may	  sell	  and	  assign	  the	  entire	  property	  to	  another,	  and	  if	  he	  does	  so	  his	   assignee	   takes	   the	   entire	   property,	   and	   it	   is	   a	   great	   mistake	   to	  suppose	  that	  any	  act	  of	  congress,	  at	  the	  date	  of	  the	  sales	  of	  the	  picture	  in	  this	   case,	   required	   that	   such	   an	   assignment	   should	   be	   in	  writing;	   and	  the	  pleadings	  show	  that	  the	  sale	  and	  delivery	  in	  each	  case	  were	  absolute	  and	   unconditional,	   and	   without	   any	   qualification,	   limitation,	   or	  restriction,	   showing	   that	   the	  entire	  property	  was	   transferred	   from	  the	  complainant	  and	  became	  vested	  in	  the	  respondent.65	  	  Thus,	   the	   court	   concluded,	   an	   author	   transferred	   his	   copyright	   (or	   his	   entitlement	   to	  
                                                           64	  Parton	  v.	  Prang,	  	  18	  F.	  Cas.	  1273,	  1278	  (C.C.D.	  Mass.	  1872).	  	  The	  1831	  Act	  did	  not	  mention	  paintings.	  Sections	  7	  and	  9	  of	  the	  1831	  Act	  expressly	  required	  that	  the	  assignment	  of	  the	  copyright	  in	  a	  manuscript,	  print,	  cut	  or	  engraving	  be	   signed	   	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   two	   witnesses.	   	   The	   court	   held	   that	   the	   word	   “manuscript”	   in	   Section	   9	   did	   not	  encompass	   a	   painting,	   and	  didn't	   address	  whether	   the	  phrase	   “print,	   cut,	   or	   engraving”	   also	   excluded	  paintings.	  	  See	  18	  F.	  Cas.	  at	  1275.	  	  As	  the	  court	  noted,	  	  the	  recent	  1870	  Copyright	  Revision	  Act	  (enacted	  after	  the	  facts	  giving	  rise	  to	  this	  case)	  had	  expressly	  extended	  copyright	  to	  paintings	  and	  required	  assignment	  of	  copyright	  in	  paintings	  to	  be	  signed	   in	  the	  presence	  of	   two	  witnesses.	   	   Id.	  at	  1276-­‐77;	  see	  Act	  of	   July	  8,	  1870	  to	  Revise,	  Consolidate	  and	  Amend	  the	  Statutes	  Relating	  to	  Patents	  and	  Copyrights,	  41st	  Cong.	  2d	  Sess.,	  16	  Stat.	  198	   	  §§	  86,	  100	  (1870).	   	  The	  court	  noted	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  paintings	  were	  expressly	  added	  to	  the	  statute	  in	  1870	  	  supported	  its	  conclusion	  that	  the	  term	  “manuscript”	  in	  the	  1831	  Act	  didn't	   include	  them.	   	   	  It	  nonetheless	  appeared	  to	  hold	  that	  paintings	  were	  entitled	  to	  copyright	  under	  the	  1831	  Act,	  even	  though	  the	   language	  enumerating	  works	  subject	  to	  copyright	  was	  the	  same	  as	  the	  language	  enumerating	  works	  requiring	  written	  assignments	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  two	  witnesses.	  See	  18	  F.	  Cas.	  at	  1278.	  	  Notwithstanding	  the	  1870	  amendment,	  later	  courts	  relied	  on	  Parton	  v	  Prang	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  assignments	  of	  the	  copyright	  in	  a	  work	  of	  art	  need	  not	  be	  in	  writing.	  	  See	  infra	  note	  65.	  	  65	  	  18	  F.	  Cas.	  at	  1278.	  A	  later	  court	  cited	  Parton	  v.	  Prang	  as	  authority	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  a	  commission	  of	  a	  work	  of	  art	   conclusively	  vests	   the	  copyright	   in	   the	  commissioner	  unless	   the	  artist	  has	  expressly	   reserved	  copyright	   in	  writing.	  	  Dielman	  v.	  White,	  102	  F.	  892,	  895	  (C.C.D.	  Mass	  1900).	  In	  Dielman,	  the	  contract	  to	  create	  a	  mosaic	  for	  the	  Library	  of	  Congress	  said	  nothing	  about	  copyright.	   	  The	  artist	  put	  a	  copyright	  notice	   in	  his	  own	  name	  on	   the	   two	  dimensional	  drawing	  created	  as	  a	  model	  for	  the	  mosaic,	  and	  on	  the	  mosaic	  itself.	  	  He	  then	  registered	  the	  copyright	  on	  his	  own	  behalf.	   	  The	  court	  held	  that	  notwithstanding	  the	  Library's	  acceptance	  of	  the	  mural	  bearing	  the	  artist's	  copyright	  notice,	  the	  contract	  itself	  had	  transferred	  the	  reproduction	  right	  and	  the	  notice	  and	  registration	  therefore	  had	  no	  effect.	  	  	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Second	  Circuit	  followed	  Dielman	  v.	  White	  in	  Yardley	  v.	  Houghton	  Mifflin,	  108	  F.2d	  28	  (2d	  Cir.	  1939),	  a	  1939	  decision	   involving	  a	  mural	  painted	   in	  1905	  by	  Charles	  Y.	  Turner.	   	  The	  City	  of	  New	  York	  commissioned	  the	  mural	  for	  a	  wall	  of	  the	  auditorium	  in	  the	  DeWitt	  Clinton	  high	  school.	  	  The	  contract	  said	  nothing	  about	  copyright.	  	  Mr.	  Turner	  put	  a	  copyright	  notice	  in	  his	  own	  name	  on	  the	  mural	  itself,	  and	  registered	  his	  copyright	  under	   the	   terms	  of	   the	   then-­‐applicable	   statute.	   	   The	   court	  held	   that,	   in	   the	   absence	  of	   any	  mention	  of	  copyright	   in	   the	   contract	  and	  any	  evidence	  of	   the	  precise	   terms	  of	   the	  agreement,	   “we	  must	   infer	   that	  whatever	  agent	  of	  the	  city	  negotiated	  with	  Turner	  did	  his	  duty	  and	  obtained	  for	  the	  city	  all	  that	  its	  contract	  for	  the	  building	  required;	   in	  other	  words,	   that	  Turner's	  contract	  of	  employment	  did	  not	  reserve	  the	  copyright.”	  108	  F.2d	  at	  31.	   If	  you’ve	   been	   reading	  with	   great	   care,	   you	  may	   be	  wondering	  why	   the	   notice	   in	   the	   artists’	   names	   on	   Dielman’s	  mosaic	   and	   Turner’s	  murals	   didn’t	   void	   the	   copyrights.	   In	   American	   Tobacco	   Co.	   v.	  Werckmeister,	   207	  U.S.	   284	  (1907),	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  had	  held	  that	  no	  copyright	  notice	  was	  required	  on	  an	  original	  painting,	  as	  distinguished	  from	  copies	  of	  it.	  	  In	  neither	  case,	  though,	  did	  the	  court	  need	  to	  reach	  that	  question.	  	  Once	  it	  held	  that	  the	  artists	  had	  parted	  with	  their	  copyrights	  and	  lacked	  standing	  to	  sue	  for	  infringement,	  the	  cases	  were	  over.	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secure	  copyright)	  in	  the	  unpublished	  painting	  simply	  by	  selling	  the	  painting.	  The	  statutory	  requirement	  of	  a	  written	  assignment	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  two	  witnesses	  didn't	  control.	  	  	   When	  Eaton	  Drone	  published	  his	  influential	  copyright	  treatise	  in	  1879,	  he	  declared	  confidently	  that,	  “[w]hile	  there	  has	  been	  much	  discussion	  as	  to	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  writing	  in	  assigning	   statutory	   copyright,	   it	   has	   never	   been	   disputed,	   and	   is	   well	   settled,	   that	   the	  literary	  property	  in	  an	  unpublished	  work	  may	  be	  transferred	  by	  word	  of	  mouth.”66	  	  	  	   The	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  adopted	  similar	  reasoning	  in	  Callaghan	  v.	  Myers.67	  	  Law	  book	  publisher	  E.B.	  Myers	  claimed	  to	  have	  purchased	  the	  copyright	  in	  volumes	  38	  to	  46	   of	   the	   Illinois	   Reports,	   authored	   by	   state-­‐appointed	   court	   reporter	   Norman	   Freeman.	  	  Myers	   had	   registered	   the	   copyright	   in	   his	   firm's	   name	   and	   printed	   that	   name	   in	   the	  copyright	   notice	   on	   the	   page	   following	   the	   title	   page	   of	   each	   volume.68	   When	   it	   sued	  Callahan	   for	   publishing	   allegedly	   infringing	   reports	   of	   the	   same	   cases,	   Callaghan	   argued	  that	  under	  the	  copyright	  statute,	  Myers	  could	  not	  be	  the	  proprietor	  of	  the	  copyright	  unless	  Freeman	  had	  assigned	  it	  to	  him	  in	  writing.	  The	  Court	  disagreed: While,	  after	   the	  obtaining	  of	  a	  copyright,	  a	  written	  assignment	  may	  be	  necessary	   to	   convey	   title	   to	   it,	   or	   a	   written	   license	   to	   give	   a	   right	   to	  reproduce	  copies	  of	   the	  copyrighted	  book,	  we	  perceive	  no	  reason	  why	  Myers	   or	   Myers	   &	   Chandler	   could	   not	   become	   the	   owners	   by	   parol	  transfer	   of	   whatever	   right	   Mr.	   Freeman,	   prior	   to	   the	   taking	   of	   the	  copyright,	  had	  to	  convey.	  While	  the	  work	  was	  in	  manuscript	  no	  written	  transfer	  of	  such	  manuscript	  from	  Mr.	  Freeman	  was	  necessary,	  because	  the	  copyright	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  taken.69	  	  	   Courts	  were	  willing	  to	  find	  a	  parol	  transfer	  of	  an	  author's	  rights,	  whatever	  they	  were,	  in	   an	   unpublished	   manuscript,	   notwithstanding	   the	   statute's	   requirement	   of	   a	   written	  
                                                           66	  EATON	  S.	  DRONE,	  DRONE	  ON	  COPYRIGHT	  104	  (1879)(citing	  Parton	  v.	  Prang,	  	  3	  Cliff.	  550	  (C.C.	  D.	  Mass.	  1872)).	  	  	  67	  128	  U.S.	  617	  (1888).	  	  68	  See	  38	  REPORTS	  OF	  CASES	  AT	  LAW	  AND	  IN	  CHANCERY	  	  ARGUED	  AND	  DETERMINED	  IN	  THE	  SUPREME	  COURT	  OF	  ILLINOIS	  (1867)(copyright	  notice	  on	  the	  page	  following	  the	  title	  page).	  	  69	  128	  U.S.	  at	  658.	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assignment	  to	  transfer	  copyright.	  70	  	  When	  that	  rule	  met	  up	  	  with	  the	  requirement	  	  for	  strict	  compliance	  with	   statutory	   prerequisites,	   the	   result	  was	   to	   encourage	   courts	   to	   find	   that	  authors	   had	   parted	   with	   their	   rights.	   As	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   construed	   the	   copyright	  statute,	   deviation	   from	   the	   	   statutory	   notice	   provision	  was	   fatal	   to	   the	   copyright.71	   	   The	  statute	  conditioned	  copyright	  protection	  on	  a	  notice's	  bearing	  the	  correct	  name	  and	  date.	  Without	   a	   correct	   notice,	   there	   could	   be	   no	   copyright	   protection.	   Courts	   seeking	   to	  preserve	   copyright	   protection	   had	   only	   to	   find	   some	   mechanism	   by	   which	   the	   alleged	  copyright	   proprietor	   named	   in	   the	   notice	   and	   certificate	   of	   registration	   had	   acquired	  ownership	  of	  the	  copyright.	  	  	  	   	  	  
	   III.	  Interlude:	  	  Across	  the	  Ocean	  
	  
	   In	  1886,	   fifteen	  European	  and	  Asian	  nations	  signed	   the	  original	  Berne	  Convention,	  promising	   each	   other	   to	   extend	   copyright	   protection	   to	   works	   authored	   by	   citizens	   of	  signatory	  countries.	  	  The	  United	  States	  was	  not	  able	  to	  participate,	  since	  its	  copyright	  law	  still	  limited	  protection	  to	  works	  authored	  by	  citizens	  and	  residents	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  A	  variety	   of	   amendments	   proposed	   in	   Congress	   in	   the	   19th	   century	   designed	   to	   extend	  copyright	   to	   works	   by	   foreign	   authors	   had	   failed.72	   	   Finally,	   in	   1891,	   the	   United	   States	  enacted	  the	  Chace	  Act,	  which	  enabled	  foreign	  works	  to	  receive	  copyright	  protection	  if	  they	  complied	   with	   U.S.	   requirements	   for	   registration,	   notice,	   deposit,	   renewal,	   and	   printing	  from	  type	  set	  in	  the	  United	  States.73	  Although	  the	  original	  text	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  had	  permitted	   signatories	   to	   condition	   protection	   of	   foreign	   works	   on	   compliance	   with	   any	  
                                                           70	  E.g.,	  Mifflin	  v.	  Dutton,	  190	  U.S.	  265,	  266	  (1903).	  	  71	  See	  Thompson	  v.	  Hubbard,	  131	  U.S.	  123	  (1889);	  see	  also	  Mifflin	  v.	  Dutton,	  190	  U.S.	  265,	  266	  (1903)(applying	  1831	  Act);	  Mifflin	  v.	  R.H.	  White,	  190	  U.S.	  260,	  264	  (1903)(same);	  	  DeJonge	  &	  Co	  v.	  Breuker	  &	  Kessler	  Co.,	  235	  U.S.	  33	  (1914)	  (applying	  1870	  Act).	  	  72	  See	  Thorvald	  Solberg,	  International	  Copyright	  in	  Congress	  1837-­‐1886,	  11	  Library	  J.	  250	  (1886).	  	  73	  Act	  of	  March	  3,	  1891	  §	  3,	  26	  Stat.	  1106.	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copyright	   formalities	   imposed	   by	   a	   work’s	   country	   of	   origin,74	   the	   domestic	   typesetting	  condition	  prevented	  the	  United	  States	  from	  joining	  the	  treaty.75	  	  A	  revised	  text	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convetion	  adopted	  in	  1908	  prohibited	  all	  formal	  prerequisites	  for	  international	  copyright	  protection.76	  	  United	  States	  	  law	  would	  not	  be	  even	  arguably	  	  Berne	  compliant	  until	  1989.77	  	  	  	   By	   repudiating	   formal	   preconditions	   to	   copyright,	   members	   of	   the	   Berne	   Union	  necessarily	   constrained	   the	   presumptions	   and	   trade	   practices	   surrounding	   copyright	  ownership	   and	  assignment.	   	   The	   absence	  of	   any	   	   record	  of	  who	  owns	   the	   copyright	   in	   a	  work	   is	   a	   workable	   regime	   only	   when	   either	   the	   copyright	   owner	   or	   a	   licensing	   agent	  empowered	   to	   represent	   her	   is	   easily	   identified.	   	   In	   most	   Berne	   Union	   nations,	   that	  supported	   the	   recognition	   of	   a	   strong	   presumption	   that	   copyrights	   belong	   to	   works'	  authors.78	  	  Over	  the	  next	  century,	  some	  Berne	  members	  would	  develop	  copyright	  markets	  in	  which	  authors,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  custom,	  rarely	  assigned	  their	  copyrights,	  or	  were	   legally	  restricted	  in	  doing	  so.79	  Some	  Berne	  nations	  would	  adopt	  requirements	  that	  any	  transfer	  of	  copyright	   be	   recorded.80	   	   Others	   would	   establish	   rights	   holders	   collecting	   societies	   and	  task	   them	  with	   the	   responsibility	   to	   keep	   track	   of	   copyright	   ownership.81	   	   In	   the	  United	  States,	   the	  work	   of	   identifying	   the	   rights	   holder	  was	   done	   by	   copyright	   notice,	   so	   those	  
                                                           74	  Berne	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Literary	  and	  Artistic	  Works	  art.	  2	  (1886).	  	  75	  See	  Thorvald	  Solberg,	  The	  International	  Copyright	  Union,	  36	  Yale	  L.J.	  68,	  97-­‐100(1926).	  	  76	  Revised	  Berne	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Literary	  and	  Artistic	  works	  art.	  4	  (1908).	  	  77	  There	  are	  compelling	  arguments	  that	  U.S.	  law	  is	  not	  currently	  Berne-­‐compliant.	  See,	  e.g.,	  	  ROBERTA	  ROSENTHALL	  KWALL,	  THE	  SOUL	  OF	  CREATIVITY	  37-­‐52	  (2010);	  Ginsburg,	  supra	  note	  9;	  Paul	  Goldstein,	  Fair	  Use	  in	  Context,	  31	  Colum.	  J.	  L	  &	  Arts	  	  433,	  442	  (2008);	  Justin	  Hughes,	  American	  Moral	  Rights	  and	  Fixing	  the	  Dastar	  Gap,	  2007	  Utah	  L.	  Rev.	  659.	  	  78	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  Kingdom	  Copyright	  Design	  and	  Patent	  Act	  of	  1988,	  §	  104	  (as	  amended	  2015);	  Intellectual	  Property	  Code	  of	  France,	  arts.	  L111-­‐1,	  L113-­‐1	  (2003).	  	  79	  See,	  e.g.,	  	  Copyright	  Law	  of	  France	  art.	  131-­‐4	  (1994);	  Alexander	  R.	  Klett,	  Matthias	  Sonntag,	  &	  Stephan	  Wilske,	  Intellectual	  Property	  Protection	  in	  Germany	  61	  (2008).	  	  80	  E.g.,	  Copyright	  Law	  of	  Japan,	  art.	  77	  (2014).	  	  81	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  Kingdom	  Copyright	  Design	  and	  Patent	  Act	  of	  1988,	  §§	  116B,	  116C	  (as	  amended	  2015);	  	  Intellectual	  Property	  Code	  of	  France,	  arts.	  	  L	  132-­‐20-­‐1;	  L133-­‐2	  (2003);	  Spain.	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mechanisms	  	  never	  became	  robust.	  	  
	   IV.	  Copyright	  notice	  and	  	  parol	  transfers	  	   	  	   In	  the	  United	  States,	  copyright	  notice	  continued	  to	  be	  essential,	  and	  courts	  insisted	  that	  the	  person	  named	  in	  the	  notice	  be	  the	  true	  owner	  of	  the	  copyright.82	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  courts	   were	   reluctant	   to	   find	   copyright	   	   forfeit.	   	   This	   led	   them	   to	   uphold	   purported	  transfers	   of	   the	   copyright	   in	   unpublished	   works	   from	   the	   works'	   authors	   to	   copyright	  claimants	  on	  thin	  evidence.83	  Where	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  do	  so,	  though,	  they	  often	  sought	  to	  recognize	   authors'	   equitable	   claims	   to	   relief.	   	   In	  Lawrence	   v.	   Dana,	   upon	   finding	   a	   parol	  transfer	  of	  copyright	  in	  an	  unpublished	  work	  to	  the	  person	  named	  in	  the	  notice,	  the	  court	  recognized	  conditions	  requiring	  the	  copyright	  owner	  to	  secure	  the	  authors'	  permission	  or	  pay	  compensation.84	  	  	   	  In	  Belford	  v.	  Scribner,85	  the	  publisher	  of	  Common	  Sense	  in	  the	  Household:	  A	  Manual	  of	  
Practical	  Housewifery	   sued	   to	   enjoin	   the	   publication	   of	   an	   allegedly	   infringing	   cookbook.	  	  	  Defendant	  argued	  that	  the	  publisher	  could	  not	  be	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  copyright	  because	  the	  author	   was	   a	   married	   woman,	   unable	   under	   the	   law	   	   to	   dispose	   of	   her	   own	   personal	  property,	  and	  her	  husband	  had	  not	  assigned	   the	  copyright	   to	  his	  wife's	  books	   in	  writing.	  	  Agreeing	  with	  the	  lower	  court	  that	  “if	  there	  is	  any	  ownership	  in	  this	  work	  by	  copyright	  at	  all,	   it	   is	   in	   the	   [publisher],	   in	  whose	  name	   the	  copyright	  was	   taken	  and	  now	  stands,”	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  concluded	  that	  the	  husband's	  acquiescence	  in	  the	  publisher's	  claim	  to	  own	  
                                                           82	  E.g.,	  Osgoode	  v.	  Aloe,	  83	  F.	  470,	  470-­‐72	  (C.C.E.D.	  Mo.	  1897).	  	  83	  E.g.,	  Belford	  v.	  Scribner,	  144	  U.S.	  488,	  504	  (1892);	  Houghton-­‐Mifflin	  v.	  Stackpole	  &	  Sons,	  104	  F.2d	  306	  (2d	  Cir.	  1939);	  Gerlach-­‐Barklow	  v.	  Morris	  &	  Bendien,	  23	  F.2d	  159	  (2d	  Cir	  1927);	  Grant	  v.	  Kellogg.	  58	  F.	  Supp.	  48	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1944).	  	  84	  15	  F.	  Case	  at	  53-­‐55.	  	  Other	  courts	  devised	  similar	  gambits.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Maurel	  v.	  Smith,	  271	  F.	  211	  (2d	  Cir.	  1921);	  Dam	  v.	  Kirk	  La	  Shelle,	  175	  F	  902	  (2d	  Cir.	  1910);	  Fitch	  v.	  Young,	  230	  F.	  743	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1916),	  aff'd	  mem.	  239	  F.	  1021	  (2d	  Cir.	  1917).	  	  85	  144	  U.S.	  488	  (1892).	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the	  copyright	  justified	  the	  inference	  that	  “legal	  title	  ...	  was	  in	  some	  due	  and	  proper	  manner	  conveyed	  to	  and	  vested	  in	  the	  persons	  who	  secured	  the	  copyright	  thereof.”86	  	  	  	   In	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  as	  publishers	  increasingly	  assumed	  the	  rights	  of	  copyright	  proprietors,	  even	  the	  lax	  presumptions	  of	  copyright	  transfer	  did	  not	  always	  suffice.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  written	  documents	  undermined	  an	  assertion	  that	  copyright	  was	  transferred	  implicitly.87	  	  In	  others,	  claimants	  introduced	  no	  evidence	  of	  how	  they	  became	  the	  alleged	  proprietors	  of	  copyrights	  in	  the	  works	  they	  published.88	  	  Without	  some	  evidence	  of	  facts	  to	  support	  a	  transfer,	  some	  courts	  held	  that	  the	  alleged	  proprietor's	  claim	  of	  copyright	  ownership	  was	  void.89	  Others,	  though,	  relied	  on	  bare	  surmise	  to	  support	  their	  conclusion	  that	  the	  proprietor	  had	  somehow	  gained	  ownership	  of	  the	  common	  law	  copyright	  and	  the	  right	  to	  apply	  for	  federal	  statutory	  protection.90	  	  	  	  	  	   So	   far,	   the	   cases	   finding	   a	  parol	   transfer	   of	   common	   law	   copyright	   from	  author	   to	  proprietor	  predicated	  that	  transfer	  on	  a	  supposed	  agreement	  between	  the	  author	  and	  the	  person	  in	  whose	  name	  the	  the	  copyright	  was	  registered.91	  	  At	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  though,	   courts	   began	   to	   issue	   decisions	   finding	   that	   the	   copyright	   had	   vested	   in	   the	  
                                                           86	  144	  U.S.	  at	  504.	  	  87	  E.g.,	  Press	  Pub.	  v.	  Monroe,	  73	  F.	  196	  (2d	  Cir.	  1896);	  see	  also	  Public	  Ledger	  v.	  N.Y.	  Times,	  275	  F.	  562	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1921),	  affd	  per	  curiam	  279	  F	  747	  (2d	  Cir.1922)(construing	  1909	  Act);	  Public	  Ledger	  v.	  Post	  Printing,	  294	  F.	  230	  (8th	  Cir	  1923)(construing	  1909	  Act).	  	  88	  	  E.g.,	  Yuengling	  v.	  Schile,	  12	  F.	  97,	  100-­‐01	  (C.C.S.D.N.Y.	  1882).	  	  	  89	  E.g.,	  Yuengling	  v.	  Schile,	  12	  F.	  97	  (C.C.S.D.N.Y.	  1882).	  	  See	  also	  Kaplan	  v.	  Fox	  Fim,	  19	  F.	  Supp.	  780	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1937)(constuing	  1909	  Act).	  That	  meant	  that	  the	  publication	  of	  copies	  with	  notice	  in	  the	  alleged	  proprietors'	  name,	  if	  done	  with	  the	  permission	  of	  the	  author	  or	  true	  copyright	  proprietor,	  would	  have	  caused	  the	  work	  to	  enter	  the	  public	  domain.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Egner	  v.	  E.	  C.	  Schirmer	  Music	  Co.,	  139	  F.2d	  398	  (1st	  Cir.	  1943). 	  	  90	  E.g.,	  Dielman	  v.	  White,	  102	  F.	  892,	  895	  (C.C.	  D.	  Mass.	  1900).	  	  See	  also	  Yardley	  v.	  Houghton	  Mifflin,	  108	  F.2d	  28	  (2d	  Cir.	  1939).	  	  91	  See,	  e.g.,	  Dielman	  v.	  White,	  102	  F.	  892,	  895	  (C.C.	  D.	  Mass.	  1900);	  Parton	  v.	  Prang,	  	  18	  F.	  Cas.	  1273,	  1278	  (C.C.	  D.	  Mass.	  1872);	  Lawrence	  v.	  Dana,	  15	  F.	  Cas.	  26	  (C.C.DMass	  1869).	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employer,	  notwithstanding	   the	  absence	  of	  any	  evidence	  of	  a	  parol	   transfer,	  based	  on	   the	  bare	   fact	   of	   employment.92	   These	   early	   cases	   involved	   disputes	   between	   employers	   and	  third	  parties	  who	  challenged	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  employer's	  copyright,	  rather	  than	  between	  employers	  and	  author-­‐employees.	  From	  these	  cases,	  courts	  evolved	  what	  became	  the	  work	  for	  hire	  doctrine.93	  	  	  	  
	   V.	  Notice	  in	  the	  wrong	  name	  	  	   Thus,	  the	  state	  of	  United	  States	  law	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  was	  that	  copyright	  protection	   required	   scrupulous	   compliance	   with	   the	   statute's	   registration,	   deposit	   and	  notice	  provisions,	  but	   that	   the	  statutory	  provision	  requiring	  any	  copyright	  assignment	   to	  be	   in	   writing	   had	   no	   application	   to	   works	   until	   after	   they	   were	   published.	   	   That	  combination	  encouraged	  courts	  to	  conclude	  that	  if	  copyright	  protection	  subsisted,	  it	  must	  belong	   to	   the	   individual	   named	   in	   the	   copyright	   notice.94	   	   A	   handful	   of	   recent	   cases	   had	  upheld	   copyrights	   in	   the	   name	   of	   someone	   other	   than	   the	   author	   on	   the	   ground	   of	  employment	  rather	  than	  express	  or	   implied-­‐in-­‐fact	  assignment,	  but	  those	  cases	  were	  still	  
                                                           92	  E.g.,	  Bleistein	  v.	  Donaldson	  Lithographing,	  188	  U.S.	  239,	  248-­‐49	  (1903);	  Edward	  Thompson	  Co.	  v.	  American	  Law	  Book	  Co.,	  119	  F.	  217,	  219	  (C.C.	  S.D.N.Y.	  1902);	  Colliery	  Engineer	  Co.	  v.	  United	  Correspondence	  Schools,	  94	  F.	  152	  (C.C.	  S.D.N.Y.	  1899).	  	  See	  Catherine	  L.	  Fiske,	  Authors	  at	  Work:	  	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Work-­‐For-­‐Hire	  Doctrine,	  15	  Yale	  J.	  L.	  &	  Humanities	  1,	  59-­‐62	  (2003);	  see	  also	  Oren	  Bracha,	  The	  Ideology	  of	  Authorship	  Revisited:	  	  Authors,	  Markets	  and	  Liberal	  Values	  in	  Early	  American	  Copyright,	  118	  Yale	  L.	  J.	  186,	  248-­‐54	  (2008).	  Both	  Fiske	  and	  Bracha	  suggest	  that	  the	  work	  made	  for	  hire	  doctrine	  arose	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  increasing	  appreciation	  of	  corporate	  personhood.	  93	  See	  Fisk,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  55-­‐62.	  	  The	  rule	  that	  an	  employer	  could	  own	  the	  copyright	  in	  its	  employees'	  works	  without	  either	  a	  written	  or	  parol	  assignment	  was	  a	  novelty	  and	  copyright	  lawyers	  were	  divided	  about	  whether	  it	  made	  sense.	  In	  1905,	  the	  Librarian	  of	  Congress	  convened	  a	  meeting	  of	  copyright	  lawyers	  and	  businesses	  and	  groups	  interested	  in	  copyright	  to	  discuss	  copyright	  reform.	  	  These	  discussions	  led	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  copyright	  revision	  bills,	  and	  ultimately	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  1909	  Copyright	  Act.	  	  See	  1	  	  E.	  Fulton	  Brylawski	  &	  Abe	  A.	  Goldman,	  Legislative	  History	  of	  the	  1909	  Copyright	  Act	  xii-­‐xv	  (1976).	  In	  the	  early	  discussions,	  participants	  disagreed	  about	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  law	  regarding	  employer	  ownership,	  about	  the	  wisdom	  of	  addressing	  it	  in	  a	  revision	  bill,	  and	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  an	  appropriate	  rule.	  See	  id.	  Part	  C.,	  at	  41-­‐45,	  54-­‐57,	  64-­‐69;	  2	  Brylawski	  &	  Goldman,	  supra,	  Part	  D	  at	  65,	  142-­‐48,	  188,	  207-­‐08.	   	  	  94	  E.g.,	  	  Dam	  v.	  Kirk	  La	  Shelle,	  175	  F	  902	  (2d	  Cir.	  1910).	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few.	  	  	  	  	   It's	   worth	   remarking	   that	   the	   three	   pre-­‐requisites	   to	   copyright	   ownership	   –	  	  registration	  of	  the	  printed	  title	  page	  before	  publication,	  deposit	  of	  published	  copies	  shortly	  following	   publication,	   and	   copyright	   notice	   printed	   on	   the	   title	   page	   –	   were	   all	   actions	  peculiarly	   within	   the	   competence	   of	   the	   publisher.	   	   Unless	   the	   publisher	   had	   expressly	  agreed	  to	  secure	  copyright	  in	  the	  author's	  name,	  one	  would	  expect	  the	  publisher	  to	  use	  its	  own	  name	  in	  copyright	  registration	  and	  notice,	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  author	  had	  executed	  a	  formal	  assignment.	  	  That	  would	  leave	  courts	  with	  the	  choice	  of	  holding	  the	  copyright	  void,	  or	  ratifying	  the	  publisher's	  ownership.	  	  	   A	  careful	  author	  might	  seek	  to	  ensure	  that	  copyright	  was	  	  registered	  in	  the	  author's	  name	   by	   publishing	   copies	   of	   the	   work	   that	   included	   notice	   in	   the	   author's	   name,	   and	  registering	   and	   depositing	   those	   copies.	   	   Both	   Oliver	   Wendell	   Holmes,	   Sr.	   and	   Harriet	  Beecher	  Stowe	  tried	  precisely	  that	  gambit,	  with	  disastrous	  results.95	  	  Both	  authors	  licensed	  the	  Atlantic	  Monthly	  to	  publish	  their	  works	  in	  serial	  installments.	  	  The	  earlier	  installments	  were	   published	   without	   any	   attention	   to	   copyright	   formalities.	   	   For	   the	   later	   chapters,	  though,	   the	  Atlantic	  Monthly	   included	  a	   copyright	  notice	   in	   its	  own	  name	  and	  registered	  the	   copyright	   in	   each	   monthly	   issue	   on	   its	   own	   behalf.	   	   Meanwhile,	   Holmes	   and	   Stowe	  published	   the	   full	  novels	  as	  books,	  each	  with	  notice	   in	   the	  author's	  name,	  and	  registered	  their	   copyrights	   in	   the	   books.	   	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   concluded	   that	   their	   efforts	   were	  unavailing.	   	   The	   publication	   of	   the	   initial	   chapters	   of	   both	   books	   without	   copyright	  registration,	  deposit,	  or	  notice	  had	  abandoned	  those	  chapters	  to	  the	  public	  domain.96	  	  	  The	  later	  chapters	  had	  been	  published	  both	  with	  a	  notice	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  magazine	  and	  with	  a	  notice	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  authors;	  both	  the	  magazine	  and	  the	  authors	  had	  registered	  the	  
                                                           95	  Mifflin	  v.	  Dutton,	  190	  U.S.	  265,	  266	  (1903);	  Mifflin	  v.	  R.H.	  White,	  190	  U.S.	  260,	  264	  (1903).	  	  96	  Mifflin	  v.	  R.H.	  White,	  190	  U.S.	  at	  261;	  see	  Holmes	  v.	  Hurst,	  174	  U.S.	  82	  (1899).	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copyrights.	  Those	  facts	  made	  it	  impossible	  to	  tell	  a	  plausible	  story	  about	  the	  authors'	  intent	  to	  convey	  their	  copyrights	  to	  the	  initial	  publisher	  and	  registrant,	  since	  their	  registration	  of	  their	  copyrights	  in	  their	  own	  names	  were	  inconsistent	  with	  any	  such	  intent.97	  	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeals	   for	   the	  First	  Circuit	  held	   that	   there	   could	  be	  no	  double	   copyrighting.	   98	  That	   led	  inexorably	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   if	   the	   authors	   retained	   their	   copyrights,	   the	   initial	  magazine	   publication	   of	   the	   chapters	   with	   notice	   in	   the	   magazine’s	   name	   forfeited	   the	  copyright.	   	   If	   the	   authors	   had	   assigned	   their	   copyrights	   to	   the	   Atlantic	   Monthly,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   the	   notice	   on	   the	   magazine	   would	   have	   been	   proper,	   but	   the	   subsequent	  publication	  of	  their	  novels	  with	  notice	  in	  the	  authors’	  names	  forfeited	  the	  copyright.99	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  affirmed:	  It	  is	  exceedingly	  unfortunate	  that,	  with	  the	  pains	  taken	  by	  the	  authors	  of	  these	   works	   to	   protect	   themselves	   against	   republication,	   they	   should	  have	   failed	   in	   accomplishing	   their	   object;	   but	   the	   right	   being	   purely	  statutory,	   we	   see	   no	   escape	   from	   the	   conclusion	   that,	   unless	   the	  substance	  as	  well	  as	  the	  form	  of	  the	  statute	  be	  disregarded,	  the	  right	  has	  been	  lost	  in	  both	  of	  these	  cases.100	  	  
                                                           97	  Mifflin	  v.	  R.H.	  White,	  190	  U.S.	  at	  262.	  	  98	  Mifflin	  v.	  R.H.	  White,	  112	  F.	  1004,	  1005	  (1st	  Cir.	  1902),	  affd,	  190	  U.S.	  260	  (1903).	  Accord	  Caliga	  v.	  Inter-­‐Ocean	  Newspaper,	  215	  U.S.	  182	  (1909)(“There	  is	  absolutely	  no	  provision	  in	  the	  statutes	  for	  a	  second	  filing	  of	  the	  photograph	  or	  description,	  nor	  is	  there	  any	  provision	  as	  to	  filing	  any	  amendments	  thereto,	  and	  as	  the	  matter	  is	  wholly	  the	  subject	  of	  statutory	  regulation,	  we	  are	  at	  a	  loss	  to	  perceive	  by	  what	  authority	  any	  second	  application	  for	  the	  same	  painting,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  securing	  a	  copyright	  thereon,	  can	  be	  sustained.”).	  	  99	  	  112	  F.	  at	  1005-­‐06.	  The	  trial	  court	  put	  it	  this	  way:	  The	  law	  seems	  to	  be	  settled	  that	  the	  name	  of	  the	  party	  taking	  out	  the	  copyright	  must	  be	  inserted	  in	  the	  notice	   of	   every	   edition	   published,	   and	   that	   the	   failure	   to	   do	   this	   vitiates	   the	   copyright.	   A	   literal	  compliance	  with	  the	  statute	  may	  not	  be	  required,	  but	  the	  notice	  must	  contain	  the	  essentials	  of	  the	  name,	  claim	  of	  exclusive	  right,	  and	  the	  date	  when	  obtained.	  Under	  the	  authorities,	  I	  must	  hold	  that	  the	  insertion	  of	   the	   name	   "Ticknor	   &	   Fields"	   in	   the	   copyright	   notice	   in	   the	   Atlantic	   Monthly	   for	   the	   months	   of	  November	  and	  December,	  1859,	  was	  an	  insufficient	  notice	  of	  Mrs.	  Stowe's	  copyright,	  and	  invalidates	  her	  right	  to	  any	  copyright	  in	  that	  portion	  of	  her	  book.	  	  	   Mifflin	  v.	  R.H.	  White,	  107	  F.	  708,	  710	  (C.C.D.Mass.	  1901),	  aff'd	  112	  F.	  1004	  (1st	  Cir.	  1902),	  aff'd	  190	  U.S.	  260	  (1903).	  Because	  Stowe	  and	  Holmes	  had	  authorized	  the	  serialization	  of	  their	  novels	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  Monthly,	  any	  notice	  defects	  in	  its	  publication	  of	  the	  chapters	  inured	  to	  the	  authors’	  detriment.	  	  	  	  100	  Mifflin	  v.	  Dutton,	  190	  U.S.	  at	  266.	  In	  the	  companion	  case,	  the	  Court	  noted	  that	  	  the	  magazine’s	  registration	  of	  its	  copyright	  under	  the	  title	  “Atlantic	  Monthly	  magazine”	  would	  be	  insufficient	  to	  secure	  a	  copyright	  in	  Holmes’s	  novel,	  “The	  Autocrat	  at	  the	  Breakfast	  Table.”	  See	  Mifflin	  v.	  R.H.	  White,	  190	  U.S.	  at	  264:	  With	  the	  utmost	  desire	  to	  give	  a	  construction	  to	  the	  statute	  most	  liberal	  to	  the	  author,	  we	  find	  it	  impossible	  to	  say	  that	  the	  entry	  of	  a	  book	  under	  one	  title	  by	  the	  publishers	  can	  validate	  the	  entry	  of	  another	  book	  of	  a	  different	  title	  by	  another	  person.	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   Focusing	  on	   litigated	  failures	  to	  comply	  with	  statutory	  formalities	  can	   leave	  a	   false	  impression.	   	  While	  evidence	  suggests	  that	   large	  numbers	  of	  copyright	  registrations	  failed	  to	  comply	  with	  statutory	  prerequisites,	  and	  would	  have	  been	  ruled	  invalid	  if	  their	  validity	  were	   litigated,101	   in	   most	   cases,	   copyright	   validity	   was	   not	   litigated.	   	   The	   majority	   of	  copyright	   registrations	  with	   latent	   technical	   defects	   appear	   to	  have	  worked	  well	   enough	  for	  their	  proprietors.102	  	  Even	  Harriet	  Beecher	  Stowe's	  copyright	  in	  The	  Minister's	  Wooing	  and	  Oliver	  Wendell	  Holmes's	  copyright	  in	  The	  Autocrat	  at	  the	  Breakfast	  Table	  enabled	  the	  authors	   and	   publishers	   to	   profit	   from	   the	   novels	   for	   more	   than	   forty	   years,	   from	   their	  initial	   publication	   in	   1859	   until	   the	   courts	   ruled	   the	   copyrights	   to	   be	   invalid	   in	   1901.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  Warner	  Music	  Group,	  the	  current	  claimant	  to	  a	  copyright	  in	  the	  song	  Happy	  
Birthday	   to	   You,	   has	   collected	   more	   than	   $2	   million	   annually	   from	   licensing	   the	   song,	  despite	  multiple	  defects	   in	  any	  claim	  that	  the	  copyright	   is	  still	  valid.103	   	  Most	  relevant	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  song	  was	  published	  without	  copyright	  notice	  in	  1922.104	  	  Under	  then-­‐controlling	  law,	  the	  song	  would	  have	  entered	  the	  public	  domain	  immediately.	  	  	  	  	  
	   VI.	  The	  1909	  Act	  	  	   In	   1909,	   Congress	   overhauled	   the	   copyright	   statute.	   Congress	   eliminated	  registration	  and	  deposit	  as	  prerequisites	  to	  copyright	  protection.	  105	  	  	  The	  1909	  Act	  	  made	  
                                                           101	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Jessica	  Litman,	  The	  Invention	  of	  Common	  Law	  Play	  Right,	  25	  Berkeley	  Tech.	  L.J.	  1381,	  1409	  (2010).	  	  102	  	  See	  id.	  at	  1409,	  1425-­‐26.	  	  103	  	  See	  generally	  Robert	  Brauneis,	  Copyright	  and	  the	  World's	  Most	  Popular	  Song,	  56	  J.	  Copyright	  Soc'y	  335	  (2009).	  	  104	  	  See	  Ben	  Sisario,	  An	  Old	  Songbook	  Could	  Put	  Happy	  Birthday	  in	  the	  Public	  Domain,	  NY	  Times,	  Aug.	  4,	  2015,	  at	  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/business/media/an-­‐old-­‐songbook-­‐could-­‐put-­‐happy-­‐birthday-­‐in-­‐the-­‐public-­‐domain.html;	  Daniel	  Victor,	  New	  Evidence	  Should	  Free	  “Happy	  Birthday”	  from	  Copyright	  Restrictions,	  Lawyers	  Say,	  NY	  Times,	  July	  28,	  2015,	  at	  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/nyregion/new-­‐evidence-­‐should-­‐free-­‐happy-­‐birthday-­‐from-­‐copyright-­‐lawyers-­‐say.html.	  	  	  105	  	  E.g.,	  Washingtonian	  v.	  Pearson,	  306	  U.S.	  30,	  37	  (1939);	  United	  Thrift	  Plan	  v.	  National	  Thrift	  Plan,	  34	  F.2d	  300	  (E.D.	  
24
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 122 [2015]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/122
 25 Draft 10/03/15 
copyright	   available,	   going	   forward,	   for	   works	   published	   with	   copyright	   notice.106	   That	  change	   elevated	   the	   importance	   of	   notice	   in	   the	   correct	   name.	   The	   statute,	   like	   its	  predecessors,	  specified	  both	  the	  form	  and	  position	  of	  notice.107	  	  	  	   Congress	   added	   a	   provision	   excusing	   inadvertent	  mistakes	   in	   copyright	   notices,108	  but	   courts	   construed	   that	  provision	  narrowly.109	  Congress	  also	  adopted	   the	   rule	   that	   the	  employer	  would	  be	  the	  legal	  author	  of	  works	  prepared	  by	  employees,	  by	  defining	  “author”	  to	   “include	   an	   employer	   in	   the	   case	   of	   works	   made	   for	   hire.”110	   As	   with	   all	   previous	  copyright	  statutes,	  the	  1909	  Act	  required	  that	  assignments	  or	  transfers	  of	  copyright	  be	  in	  writing.111	   Congress	   added	   a	   provision	   emphasizing	   that	   ownership	   of	   a	   copyright	   was	  distinct	  from	  the	  ownership	  of	  a	  material	  object	  embodying	  a	  work,	  and	  providing	  that	  the	  transfer	   of	   the	   	   object	   “shall	   not	   of	   itself	   constitute	   a	   transfer	   of	   the	   copyright.”112	  Nonetheless,	   the	   jurisprudence	   surrounding	   authors'	   parol	   assignments	   of	   common	   law	  copyright	   in	   unpublished	  works	   continued	   to	   control.113	   	   Courts	   evolved	   a	   presumption:	  “Ownership	  of	  an	  unpublished	  composition	  presumptively	  includes	  all	  the	  rights	  which	  the	  
                                                                                                                                                                                                             N.Y.	  1929).	  	  106	  	  See	  Act	  of	  March	  4,	  1909	  to	  Amend	  and	  Consolidate	  the	  Acts	  Respecting	  Copyright,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  60-­‐349,	  §	  9,	  35	  Stat.	  1075.	  [1909	  Act].	  	  	  Some	  unpublished	  works	  could	  for	  the	  first	  time	  acquire	  federal	  copyright	  protection	  through	  registration.	  	  Id.	  §	  11.	  	  107	  	  1909	  Act	  §§	  18,	  19.	  	  108	  	  1909	  Act	  §	  20.	  	  	  109	  	  If	  the	  notice	  on	  more	  than	  a	  small	  number	  of	  copies	  failed	  to	  comply	  scrupulously	  with	  the	  statutory	  requirements,	  courts	  held	  it	  ineffective.	  	  E.g.,	  Advertisers	  Exchange	  	  v.	  Anderson,	  144	  F.2d	  907	  (8th	  Cir.	  1944);	  Deward	  &	  Rich	  v.	  Bristol	  Savings	  &	  Loan,	  120	  F.2d	  537	  (4th	  Cir.	  1941);	  Krafft	  v.Cohen,	  117	  F.2d	  579	  (3d	  Cir.	  1941);	  Smith	  v.	  Wilkinson,	  19	  F.	  Supp.	  841	  (D.	  N.H.	  1937).	  
 110	  	  1909	  Act	  §	  62.	  	  111	  	  1909	  Act	  §	  42.	  	  The	  1909	  Act	  finally	  got	  rid	  of	  the	  long-­‐inoperative	  language	  requiring	  authors	  to	  give	  permission	  to	  publish	  only	  in	  writing	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  two	  witnesses.	  	  112	  	  1909	  Act	  	  §	  41.	  	  113	  	  E.g.,	  Houghton-­‐Mifflin	  v.	  Stackpole	  &	  Sons,	  104	  F.2d	  306	  (2d	  Cir.	  1939);	  Gerlach-­‐Barklow	  v.	  Morris	  &	  Bendien,	  23	  F.2d	  159	  (2d	  Cir	  1927);	  Grant	  v.	  Kellogg.	  58	  F.	  Supp.	  48	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1944).	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common	   law	   recognized	   therein,	   among	   them	   being	   the	   privilege	   of	   publication	   and	   of	  securing	  a	  statutory	  copyright.”114	  	  	  	   Dam	   v.	   Kirk	   La	   Shelle115	   involved	   the	   copyright	   to	   Henry	   Dam's	   short	   story,	   The	  
Transmogrification	   of	   Dan.	   	   Dam	   had	   submitted	   the	   story	   to	   Smart	   Set	   magazine,	   which	  accepted	   the	   story	   and	   sent	   Dam	   a	   check	   for	   $85.	   	  Smart	   Set	   published	   the	   story	   in	   the	  September	  1901	  issue	  of	  the	  magazine	  with	  a	  copyright	  notice	  in	  the	  publisher's	  name;	  it	  promptly	  registered	  the	  copyright	   in	   the	  entire	   issue.	  Dam	  later	  sued	  theatrical	  producer	  Kirk	  La	  Shelle	  for	  copyright	  infringement	  alleging	  that	  Kirk	  La	  Shelle's	  production	  of	  Paul	  Armstrong's	  The	  Heir	  to	  the	  Hoorah116	   infringed	  the	  copyright	  in	  Dam's	  short	  story.	   	  Dam	  insisted	  that	  he	  had	  never	  transferred	  the	  copyright	  to	  Smart	  Set,	  but	  merely	  licensed	  it	  to	  publish	   the	   story	   in	   its	  magazine.117	   The	   court	   noted	   that	   if	   Dam	  were	   right	   about	   that,	  under	  the	  Supreme	  Court's	  construction	  of	  the	  notice	  requirement,	  the	  story's	  publication	  with	  notice	  in	  the	  magazine's	  name	  rather	  than	  Dam's	  would	  have	  caused	  the	  story	  to	  enter	  the	  public	  domain.118	  The	  court	  concluded	  that	  Dam	  had	  transferred	  the	  entire	  copyright	  in	  his	  unpublished	  story	   to	  Smart	  Set,	  and	  that	   the	  publisher's	  notice	  and	  registration	   in	   its	  
                                                           114	  	  Gerlach-­‐Barklow	  v.	  Morris	  &	  Bendien,	  23	  F.2d	  159,	  (2d	  Cir.	  1927)(citing	  Drone	  on	  Copyright	  and	  Parton	  v.	  Prang).	  	  115	  	  175	  F.	  902	  (2d	  Cir.	  1910).	  	  116	  	  The	  Heir	  to	  the	  Hoorah	  opened	  at	  Broadway's	  Hudson	  Theatre	  on	  April	  10,	  1905,	  and	  closed	  on	  May	  29	  after	  59	  performances.	  	  See	  http://www.ibdb.com/production.php?id=6081.	  The	  script	  was	  later	  adapted	  as	  a	  silent	  film,	  directed	  by	  Cecil	  B.	  DeMille's	  older	  brother	  William	  Churchill	  de	  Mille.	  	  See	  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0006777/.	  	  117	  	  175	  F.	  at	  904.	  	  118	  	  	  See	  175	  F.	  at	  905-­‐06:	  	   [W]e	  think	  that	  had	  Dam	  retained	  the	  dramatic	  rights	  to	  his	  story	  the	  entry	  of	  the	  magazine	  and	  the	  notice	  of	   copyright	  would	  have	  been	   insufficient	   to	  protect	   them.	  	  A	  notice	  of	   the	   copyright	   of	   the	  Smart	  Set	  magazine	  by	   the	  Ess	  Ess	  Publishing	  Company	   is	  hardly	  equivalent	   to	  a	  notice	   that	   the	   story	  "The	  Transmogrification	  of	  Dan"	  is	  copyrighted	  by	  or	  in	  favor	  of	  H.	  J.	  W.	  Dam.	  	  ….	  	   But	  this	  question	  need	  not	  now	  be	  determined.	  	  Having	  found	  that	  the	  Ess	  Ess	  Publishing	  Company	  became	  the	  proprietor	  of	  the	  story	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  copyright	  statute,	  the	  precise	  question	  is	  whether	  that	  corporation	  took	  sufficient	  and	  proper	  steps	  to	  protect	  the	  dramatic	  rights	  which	  belonged	  to	  it	  as	  assignee.	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name	  therefore	  preserved	  the	  copyright.119	  	  	   VII.	  The	  endurance	  of	  the	  parol	  transfer	  presumption	  	  	   Because	  a	  copyright,	  if	  it	  were	  valid,	  was	  necessarily	  owned	  by	  the	  person	  or	  entity	  named	   in	   the	   notice,	   there	   was	   no	   need	   to	   develop	   conventions	   or	   presumptions	   for	  identifying	   the	   copyright	   owner,	   and	   no	   need	   to	   require	   that	   copyright	   assignments	   be	  recorded.	   	  Unless	   the	  copyright	  owner	  were	   the	  person	  or	  entity	  name	   in	   the	  notice,	   the	  copyright	   was	   invalid.	   	   In	   response,	   courts	   evolved	   unprincipled	   and	   unpredictable	  doctrines	   to	   justify,	   whenever	   possible,	   holding	   that	   the	   title	   to	   the	   copyright	   was	  effectively	   assigned	   to	   the	   person	   or	   entity	   named	   in	   the	   notice.	   	  Where	   undocumented	  parol	   transfers	   could	   not	   be	   inferred,	   or	   would	   not	   support	   the	   right	   claimed,	   courts	  applied	   an	   increasingly	   broad	   interpretation	   of	   the	   works	  made	   for	   hire	   doctrine.120	   By	  1955,	   the	   Copyright	   Office	   estimated	   that	   40%	   of	   new	   applications	   for	   copyright	  registration	  were	  for	  works	  made	  for	  hire.121	  	  	  	  	   The	  presumption	  that	  an	  author	  transferred	  his	  copyright	  whenever	  he	  submitted	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  work	  for	  publication	  persisted	  under	  the	  1909	  Act.122	   	  The	  	  presumption	  may	  
                                                           119	  	  	  Dam	  had	  persuaded	  the	  magazine	  to	  reassign	  to	  him	  whatever	  interest	  it	  had	  in	  the	  copyright	  to	  his	  story;	  that	  enabled	  his	  widow	  to	  recover	  from	  Kirk	  La	  Shelle	  for	  its	  production	  of	  an	  infringing	  play.	  	  	  See	  id.	  at	  907.	  	  120	  	  	  	  E.g.,	  Brattleboro	  Publishing	  v.	  Windmill	  Publishing,	  369	  F.2d	  565	  (2d	  Cir.	  1966);	  Shapiro	  &	  Bernstein	  Co.	  v.	  Bryan,	  123	  F.2d	  697	  (2d	  Cir.	  1941).	  	  Designating	  a	  work	  as	  made	  for	  hire	  was	  significantly	  worse	  for	  authors	  than	  holding	  that	  they	  had	  assigned	  their	  copyrights	  before	  publication.	  	  Sections	  23	  and	  24	  of	  the	  1909	  Act	  vested	  the	  copyright	  renewal	  in	  the	  author	  or	  author's	  surviving	  family.	  	  Courts	  construed	  the	  act	  to	  allow	  authors	  who	  assigned	  their	  common	  law	  copyrights	  before	  publication	  to	  apply	  for	  the	  renewal	  term.	  	  If	  works	  were	  created	  by	  employees	  as	  works	  made	  for	  hire,	  though,	  the	  employer	  was	  the	  author	  and	  entitled	  to	  apply	  for	  renewal.	  	  See,	  e.g,	  Tobani	  v.	  Carl	  Fisher,	  Inc.,	  98	  F.2d	  57	  (2d	  Cir.	  1938).	  	  121	  	  See	  Borge	  Varmer,	  Study	  No.	  13:	  	  Works	  Made	  for	  Hire	  and	  On	  Commission	  139	  &	  n.49,	  Studies	  on	  Copyright	  (1958).	  	  122	   	  E.g.,	  Houghton-­‐Mifflin	  v.	  Stackpole	  &	  Sons,	  104	  F.2d	  306	  (2d	  Cir.	  1939);	  Freudenthal	  v.	  Hebrew	  Pub.	  Co.,	  44	  F.	  Supp.	  754	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1942);	  Pushman	  v.	  New	  York	  Graphic	  Soc.,	  25	  N.Y.S.2d	  32	  (N.Y.	  Sup.	  Ct.	  1941).	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originally	  have	  arisen	  to	  prevent	  the	  forfeiture	  of	  copyright	  from	  defects	  in	  notice,	  but	  later	  courts	  applied	  it	  as	  a	  freestanding	  legal	  rule	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  notice	  defects.	  Where	  the	  author	   claimed	   to	   have	   reserved	   any	   rights	   in	   his	   copyright,	   courts	  were	   unsympathetic	  unless	  the	  author	  could	  produce	  written	  documentation	  that	  he	  retained	  the	  copyright	  or	  any	  part	  of	  it.123	  	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  rule	  worked	  to	  authors'	  disadvantage.124	  	  	  	  
	   VIII.	  Copyright	  without	  notice	  
	  	   The	  repudiation	  of	  copyright	  notice	  began	  with	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  1976	  Copyright	  Act.	  Without	  repealing	  notice,	  registration,	  and	  deposit	  requirements,	  Congress	  made	  most	  errors	  in	  copyright	  notice	  harmless.125	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Congress	  endorsed	  an	  expansive	  version	  of	  copyright	  divisibility	  under	  which	  any	  subpart	  of	  any	  copyright	  exclusive	  right	  could	  be	  separately	  assigned	  and	  owned.126	  Going	  forward,	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  necessary	  that	  a	   copyright	   be	   owned	   by	   a	   person	   named	   in	   the	   copyright	   notice,	   or	   by	   anyone	   in	  particular.	   	  Congress	  moderated	  the	  chaos-­‐inducing	  aspects	  of	  these	  changes	  by	  tweaking	  the	  copyright	  ownership	  rules.	   	  By	  vesting	  copyright	   in	  authors	  as	  of	   the	  work's	   fixation,	  Congress	   eliminated	   the	   parol	   transfer	   of	   common	   law	   copyright,	   and	   made	   the	  requirement	  of	  a	  written	  copyright	  assignment	  applicable	  to	  unpublished	  works	  as	  well	  as	  published	  ones.	  Once	  a	  work	  was	   initially	   fixed	   in	   tangible	   form,	   copyright	   vested	   in	   the	  author.127	   	   Thereafter,	   ownership	   could	   be	   transferred	   only	   by	   a	   signed,	   written	  
                                                           123	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Manners	  v.	  Morosco,	  252	  U.S.	  317	  (1920);	  Maurel	  v.	  Smith,	  271	  F.	  211	  (2d	  Cir.	  1921);	  Grant	  v.	  Kellogg,	  58	  F.	  Supp.	  48	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1944);	  Pushman	  v.	  	  New	  York	  Graphic	  Soc.,	  25	  N.Y.S.2d	  32	  (N.Y.	  Sup.	  Ct.	  1941). 	  124	  	  E.g.,	  Grant	  v.	  Kellogg,	  58	  F.	  Supp.	  48	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1944)(“When	  plaintiff	  furnished	  his	  art	  work	  to	  the	  defendant	  for	  publication,	  he	  lost	  whatever	  common-­‐law	  rights	  to	  copy	  he	  possessed”);	  see	  also	  Yardley	  v.	  Houghton-­‐Mifflin,	  108	  F.2d	  28	  (2d	  Cir.	  1939)	   (holding	   that	  where	  contract	   for	  mural	   is	   silent	  as	   to	  copyright,	   court	  must	  presume	  that	  artist	  transferred	  rather	  than	  reserving	  it).	  	  125	  	  1976	  Act	  §§	  404,	  405,	  406.	  	  126	  	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  201(d)(2).	  	  
127 	  	  Congress	  retained	  the	  rule	  that	  the	  “author”	  of	  a	  copyrighted	  work	  includes	  the	  employer	  in	  works	  made	  for	  hire.	  	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  201(b).	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instrument.128	  By	  enacting	  a	  detailed	  definition	  of	  	  works	  made	  for	  hire,	  Congress	  sought	  to	  introduce	  some	  clarity	  and	  predictability	  to	  the	  determination	  whether	  a	  work	  was	  owned	  by	  its	  creator	  or	  the	  person	  or	  entity	  who	  financed	  its	  creation.129	  It	  didn't	  appear	  to	  occur	  to	  anyone	  contemplating	  these	  changes	  that	   it	  might	  be	  necessary	  to	  retrofit	  some	  of	  our	  ownership,	   assignment,	   and	   licensing	   rules	   to	   make	   it	   easier	   to	   ascertain	   who	   had	  authority	  to	  license	  particular	  copyright	  uses.	  	  	  	  	   In	  1989,	  we	  abandoned	  notice	   requirements	  completely.	   	  Again,	  nobody	  suggested	  that	   Congress	  might	   need	   to	   think	   about	   new	  provisions	   that	  might	   replace	   some	  of	   the	  work	  that	  we	  had	  relied	  on	  copyright	  notice	  to	  accomplish.	  	  Now	  that	  copyright	  vests	  upon	  fixation,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  all	  of	  the	  precedent	  surrounding	  assignment	  and	  transfer	  of	  common	   law	   copyrights	   would	   be	   irrelevant.	   	   In	   fact,	   those	   doctrines	   have	   proved	  disturbingly	   long-­‐lived.	   	   First,	   of	   course,	   they	   control	   determinations	   of	   initial	   copyright	  ownership	   in	  works	   first	  published	  or	   registered	  before	   January	  1,	  1978.	   In	  21st	   century	  cases	  involving	  20th	  century	  copyrights,	  the	  old	  incoherent	  analyses	  still	  control,	  and	  cases	  commonly	   reach	   irreconcilable	   results	   on	   identical	   facts.130	   Meanwhile,	   those	   analyses	  have	  slopped	  over	  to	  confuse	  courts	  seeking	  to	  determine	  who	  owns	  the	  copyright	  in	  more	  recent	   works.131	   	   	   Publishers	   continue	   to	   presume	   that	   they	   own	   the	   copyrights	   in	   the	  
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
	  128	  	  	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  201(d).	  	  The	  statute	  also	  permits	  transfer	  “by	  operation	  of	  law.”	  Id.	  	  129	  	  	  See	  Jessica	  D.	  Litman,	  Copyright,	  Compromise,	  and	  Legislative	  History,	  72	  Cornell	  L.	  Rev.	  857,	  888-­‐93	  (1987).	  	  130	  	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  	  Keilor	  v.	  Harlequin	  Enterprises,	  751	  F.3d	  64	  (2d	  Cir.	  2014);	  Marvel	  Characters	  v.	  Kirby,	  726	  F.3d	  119	  (2d	  Cir.	  2013);	  Gary	  Friedrich	  Enterprises	  v.	  Marvel	  Characters,	  716	  F.3d	  302	  (2d	  Cir.	  2013);	  ;	  	  Mattel	  v.	  MGA,	  616	  F.3d	  904	  (9th	  Cir.	  2009);	  Marvel	  Characters	  v.	  Simon,	  301	  F.3d	  280	  (2d	  Cir.	  2002);	  	  Harper	  Collins	  v.	  Open	  Road,	  7	  F.	  Supp.	  3d	  363	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2014);	  Random	  House	  v.	  Rosetta	  Books,	  150	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  613	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2001),	  aff’d	  283	  F.3d	  490	  (2d	  Cir.	  2002).	  	  131	  	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  	  Aldon	  Accessories	  Ltd.	  v.	  Spiegel,	  Inc.,	  738	  F.	  2d	  548	  (2d	  Cir.	  1984);	  Blum	  v.	  Kline,	  1988	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  4424	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1988);	  Sasnett	  v.	  Convergent	  Media	  Sys.,	  1997	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  17960	  (D.	  Mass.	  1977).	   	  See	  also	  16	  Casa	   Duse	   v.	   Merkin,	   791	   F.3d	   247	   (2d	   Cir.	   2015)(holding	   that	   copyright	   in	   raw	   film	   footage	   created	   by	   a	   film	  director	  who	  was	  not	  an	  employee	  and	  had	  not	  signed	  a	  work	  for	  hire	  agreement	  was	  owned	  by	  the	  film	  producer	  as	  author	  because	   it	  had	  “initiated	   the	  project;	  acquired	   the	  rights	   to	   the	  screenplay;	   selected	   the	  cast,	   crew	  and	  director;	  controlled	  the	  production	  schedule;	  and	  coordinated	  (or	  attempted	  to	  coordinate)	  the	  film's	  publicity	  and	  release.”	  791	  F.3d	  at	  260.	   	  16	  Casa	  Duse	  doesn't	  cite	  any	  of	   the	  older	  cases	   I've	  been	  discussing	   in	   this	  article.	   	   It	  relies,	   instead	  on	  recent	  cases	  deciding	  whether	   two	  contributors	   to	  a	  copyrighted	  work	  should	  be	  deemed	   joint	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works	  that	   they	  publish	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  author	  has	  executed	  and	  signed	  a	  transfer	  of	  copyright	  ownership.132	  	  	  	   Scholars	   and	   prospective	   licensees	   complain	   that	   it	   has	   become	   impossible	   to	  ascertain	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  rights	  one	  seeks	  to	  license.133	  	  We	  read	  ubiquitous	  stories	  of	   false134	  or	  conflicting135	  ownership	  claims,	  only	  a	   tiny	   fraction	  of	  which	   land	   in	  
                                                                                                                                                                                                             authors.	  	  The	  court	  resolves	  that	  question	  in	  the	  negative,	  and	  then	  concludes	  that	  Merkin's	  contribution,	  which	  is	  indisputably	  not	  a	  work	  made	  for	  hire	  and	  was	  not	  assigned	  in	  writing,	  must	  belong	  to	  Casa	  Duse	  anyway.	  	  How?	  	  A	  little	  magic;	  a	   little	  sleight	  of	  hand.	  See	  2015	  US	  App.	  Lexis	  at	  1194-­‐95.	  Cf.	  Lawrence	  v.	  Dana.	   	  Arguably,	  the	   joint	  authorship	  cases	  reflect	  the	  values	  of	  the	  parol	  transfer	  jurisprudence,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  show	  an	  unseemly	  and	  sometimes	  unreasoning	  eagerness	  to	  move	  the	  ownership	  of	  copyrights	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  works'	  exploiters,	  but	  the	  joint	  work	  cases	  don't	  expressly	  rely	  on	  any	  of	  the	  19th	  or	  early	  20th	  century	  precedents	  that	  I've	  focused	  on	  in	  this	  article.	  	  	  	  132	  	  One	  of	  my	  favorite	  examples	  involves	  the	  American	  Society	  of	  Composers	  Authors	  and	  Publishers	  (ASCAP),	  who	  should	   surely	   know	   better.	   	   From	   1938	   to	   2010,	   ASCAP	   sponsored	   the	   Nathan	   Burkan	   Memorial	   Competition,	  designed	   to	   encourage	   scholarship	   about	   copyright	   law	   by	   awarding	   cash	   prizes	   for	   law	   student	   essays.	   See	  Forward,	  1	  Copyright	  L.	  Symposium	  (ASCAP)	  5	  (1939).	  	  A	  number	  of	  prominent	  copyright	  scholars	  wrote	  their	  first	  copyright	  paper	  as	  entries	   in	   the	  Burkan	  Competition.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Paul	  Goldstein,	   	  Copyrighting	  the	  New	  Music,	  16	  Copyright	  L.	  Symposium	  (ASCAP)1	  (1968);	  Robert	  A.	  Gorman,	  Copyright	  for	  	  the	  Collection	  and	  Representation	  of	  Facts,	   12	   Copyright	   L.	   Symposium	   (ASCAP)	   30	   (1963);	   Melville	   Nimmer,	   Inroads	   on	   Copyright	   Protection,	   4	  Copyright	  L.	  Symposium	  2	  (ASCAP)	  (1952).	  In	  1990,	  14	  years	  after	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  1976	  Copyright	  Act,	  ASCAP	  adopted	  the	  following	  rule	  governing	  submissions	  to	  the	  contest:	  	  “7.(d).	  	  All	  papers	  submitted	  to	  the	  competition	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  property	  of	  the	  Society	  and	  the	  Society	  shall	  be	  copyright	  owner	  of	  the	  works.”	  See	  Papers	  for	  1990:	  	  Rules	  Governing	  the	  Competition,	  40	  Copyright	  L.	  Symposium	  xxii	  (1997).	  	  (This	  is	  especially	  curious	  given	  that	  rule	  7.(c)	  permitted	  submissions	  that	  had	  been	  or	  would	  be	  published	  in	  law	  reviews,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  papers'	  entry	   in	   the	  Competition	  was	   “duly	  noted.”	   	   Id.	   	  Presumably,	   the	   law	  reviews	  might	  also	  have	  believed	   that	   they	  owned	   the	   copyright	   in	   the	   papers	   they	   published	   and	  might	   even	   have	   asked	   the	   students	   to	   execute	  written	  copyright	  assignments.)	  	  133	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Mark	  Lemley,	  Dealing	  with	  Overlapping	  Copyrights	  on	  the	  Internet,	  22	  U.	  Dayton	  L.	  Rev.	  547,	  570-­‐74	  (1995);	  Jessica	  Litman,	  Sharing	  and	  Stealing,	  27	  Hastings	  Comm/Ent	  1,	  21-­‐22	  (2004);	  Molly	  Shaffer	  Van	  Houweling,	  Author	  Autonomy	  and	  Atomism	  in	  Copyright	  Law,	  Va.	  L.	  Rev.	  (2009).	  See	  also,	  e.g.,	  Andy	  Baio,	  Criminal	  Creativity:	  	  Untangling	  Cover	  Song	  Licensing	  on	  YouTube,	  Wired,	  May	  2,	  2012,	  at	  <http://www.wired.com/2012/05/opinion-­‐baio-­‐criminal-­‐creativity/>(reporting	  that	  YouTube	  has	  licensed	  sync	  rights	  from	  thousands	  of	  music	  publishers	  to	  permit	  the	  uploading	  of	  cover	  version	  of	  their	  songs,	  but	  “[f]rustratingly,	  we	  have	  no	  idea	  which	  publishers	  have	  signed	  on”).	  	  134	  	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Tim	  Cushing,	  YouTube	  Content	  ID	  Trolls:	  	  Claim	  Copyright	  on	  Lots	  of	  Gameplay	  Videos,	  Hope	  No	  One	  Complains,	  Collect	  Free	  Money	  [Updated],	  TechDirt,	  Feb.	  28,	  2013,	  at	  <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130227/20563322144/youtubes-­‐contentid-­‐trolls-­‐claim-­‐copyright-­‐lots-­‐gameplay-­‐videos-­‐hope-­‐no-­‐one-­‐complains-­‐collect-­‐free-­‐money.shtml>;	  Ben	  Jones,	  MegaUpload,	  Universal,	  and	  the	  DMCA-­‐less	  Mega	  Song	  Takedown,	  TorrentFreak,	  Dec.	  16,	  2011,	  at	  at	  https://torrentfreak.com/megaupload-­‐youtube-­‐and-­‐the-­‐dmca-­‐less-­‐mega-­‐song-­‐takedown-­‐111216/;	  David	  Kravets,	  Rogues	  Falsely	  Claim	  Copyright	  on	  YouTube	  Videos	  to	  Hijack	  Dollars,	  Wired,	  Nove.	  21,	  2011,	  at	  at	  http://www.wired.com/2011/11/youtube-­‐filter-­‐profiting/.	  	  135	  	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Eriq	  Gardner,	  Nina	  Simone’s	  Heirs	  Allege	  Sony	  Music	  Operates	  a	  Piracy	  Ring,	  The	  Hollywood	  Reporter,	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court.136	   Purported	   copyright	   owners	  have	   asserted	   that	   they	   cannot	   reliably	   identify	   all	  the	  works	  whose	   copyrights	   they	  own.137	  Who	  owns	   the	   right	   to	   license	  a	  particular	  use	  turns	   out	   to	   require	   close	   reading	   of	   the	   individual	   documents	   in	   the	   copyright	   chain	   of	  title	  –	  none	  of	  which	  are	  publicly	  available.138	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  we	  never	  developed	  a	  legal	  presumption	  or	  custom	  that	  authors	  retain	  their	  copyrights;	  we	  have	  no	  requirement	  that	   transfers	   of	   copyright	   ownership	  be	   recorded	   in	   some	  public	   registry;	   and	   for	  most	  works	  of	  authorship,	  we	  lack	  a	  robust	  system	  of	  collecting	  societies	  tasked	  with	  the	  job	  of	  tracking	  down	  rights-­‐holders	  and	  collecting	  and	  remitting	   license	   fees	   for	   their	  works.139	  	  We	  face	  a	  legal	  milieu	  in	  which	  the	  only	  users	  of	  preexisting	  copyrighted	  works	  who	  can	  do	  
                                                                                                                                                                                                             May	  21,	  2015,	  at	  http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-­‐esq/nina-­‐simones-­‐heirs-­‐allege-­‐sony-­‐797376’	  Eriq	  Gardner,	  In	  Big	  Ruling,	  Sony	  Beats	  “Iron	  Man”	  Composer’s	  Lawsuit,	  The	  Hollywood	  Reporter,	  April	  21,	  2015,	  at	  http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-­‐esq/big-­‐ruling-­‐sony-­‐beats-­‐iron-­‐790466;	  Martha	  Neill,	  Composer's	  heirs	  sue	  CBS	  over	  use	  of	  iconic	  'Hawaii	  Five-­‐0'	  theme	  music	  in	  TV	  show	  remake,	  ABA	  Journal,	  March	  20,	  2015,	  at	  <	  http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/composers_heirs_sue_cbs_over_use_of_iconic_hawaii_five_o_theme_music_in_mod>.	  .	  	  136	  	  	  See	  16	  Casa	  Duse	  v.	  Merkin,	  2015	  US	  App.	  LEXIS	  11053	  (2d	  Cir.);	  Garcia	  v.	  Google,	  786	  F.3d	  733	  (9th	  Cir.	  2015);	  Severe	  Records	  v.	  Rich,	  658	  F.	  3d	  571	  (6th	  Cir.	  2011);	  Brownstein	  v.	  Lindsay,	  2012	  US	  Dist	  LEXIS	  170338	  (D.N.J.	  2012),	  rev’d	  742	  F.3d	  55	  (3d	  Cir.	  2014);	  Crispin	  v.	  Christian	  Audigier,	  Inc.,	  839	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1086	  (C.D.	  Cal.	  2011);	  Megaupload	  v.	  Universal	  Music	  Group,	  	  No.	  C-­‐11-­‐6216	  CW(N.D.	  Cal.	  Filed	  Dec.	  12,	  2011).	  	  	  137	  	  	  See	  A&M	  Records	  v.	  Napster,	  114	  F.	  Supp.	  2D	  896,	  925	  (2000)(“despite	  their	  claim	  that	  it	  would	  be	  burdensome	  or	  even	  impossible	  to	  identify	  all	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  music	  they	  own,	  plaintiffs	  have	  made	  at	  least	  a	  minimal	  effort	  to	  describe	  the	  works	  in	  suit”).	  	  138	  	  	  Who,	  for	  example,	  owns	  the	  copyright	  in	  this	  article?	  	  I	  know	  the	  answer,	  because	  I	  have	  read	  (or,	  by	  the	  time	  you	  read	  this,	  will	  have	  read)	  both	  my	  University's	  copyright	  policy	  and	  the	  publication	  agreement	  that	  this	  Journal	  persuaded	  me	  to	  sign.	  	  You	  have	  no	  way	  to	  figure	  it	  out,	  except	  to	  ask	  me,	  and	  my	  University,	  and	  the	  Journal,	  and	  hope	  that	  we	  all	  give	  you	  the	  same	  answer.	  	  That's	  a	  trivial	  problem	  with	  a	  work,	  like	  this	  one,	  that	  has	  negligible	  economic	  value,	  but	  the	  same	  problems	  obtain	  for	  works	  with	  great	  commercial	  significance.	  See,	  e.g.,	  	  Keilor	  v.	  Harlequin	  Enterprises,	  751	  F.3d	  64	  (2d	  Cir.	  2014);	  Random	  House	  v.	  Rosetta	  Books,	  150	  F.	  Supp.	  613	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2001),	  aff’d	  283	  F.3d	  490	  (2d	  Cir.	  2002).	  The	  fact	  that	  copyright	  owners	  may	  assign	  different	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  different	  exploiters	  in	  any	  combination	  exacerbates	  the	  problem	  significantly.	  	  139	  	  	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  collecting	  societies	  license	  some	  uses	  of	  some	  works.	  	  There	  are	  well-­‐established	  collecting	  societies	  that	  license	  public	  performance	  of	  music	  and	  digital	  public	  performance	  of	  sound	  recordings.	  See	  United	  States	  Copyright	  Office,	  	  Copyright	  and	  the	  Music	  Marketplace:	  	  A	  Report	  of	  the	  Register	  of	  Copyrights	  32-­‐52	  (2015).	  	  The	  Copyright	  Clearance	  Center	  has	  for	  decades	  sought	  to	  perform	  a	  similar	  service	  for	  copying	  and	  distribution	  of	  	  published	  texts,	  with	  limited	  success.	  See	  Cambridge	  University	  Press	  v.	  Patton,	  769	  F.	  3d	  1232,	  1240-­‐41	  (11th	  Cir.	  2014).	  Collecting	  societies	  have	  historically	  had	  an	  uneasy	  relationship	  with	  U.S.	  antitrust	  law,	  see,	  e.g.,	  John	  M.	  Kernochan,	  Music	  Performing	  Rights	  Organizations	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America:	  	  Special	  Characteristics,	  Restraints,	  and	  Public	  Attitudes,	  10	  Colum.	  J.	  L.	  &	  Arts	  	  	  333	  (1986),	  and	  	  are	  controversial	  among	  both	  copyright	  owners	  and	  prospective	  licensees.	  	  See	  generally	  Jonathan	  Band,	  Cautionary	  Tales	  about	  Collective	  Rights	  Organizations,	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2149036	  (2012).	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business	  with	  confidence	  are	  the	  entertainment	  and	  information	  behemoths	  large	  enough	  that	  they	  can	  afford	  to	  self-­‐insure.	  	  	  	   What's	  to	  be	  done?	  	  One	  partial	  response	  that	  would	  probably	  do	  the	  least	  violence	  to	   the	   current	   structure	   of	   the	   U.S.	   copyright	   marketplace	   would	   be	   Professor	   Jane	  Ginsburg's	   suggestion	   to	   adopt	   and	   enforce	   a	   requirement	   that	   transfers	   of	   copyright	  ownership	  be	  recorded	  and	  the	  records	  maintained	   in	  a	  publicly	  accessible	   format.140	  An	  easy-­‐to-­‐consult	   recordation	   database	   would	   largely	   duplicate	   the	   owner-­‐identification	  function	   of	   copyright	   notice;	   that	   would	   partly	   ameliorate	   the	   inconsistency	   and	  unpredictability	  of	  copyright	  ownership	  under	  U.S.	  law	  –	  at	  least	  for	  prospective	  licensees.	  Whether	  authors	  would	  have	  better	  luck	  retaining	  their	  rights	  if	  their	  purported	  assignees	  needed	  to	  publicly	  declare	  their	  ownership	  claims	  is	  much	  harder	  to	  predict,	  	  but	  perhaps	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  that's	  no	  longer	  something	  we	  care	  about.	  	  	  	  	  
 
                                                           140	  	  See	  Ginsburg,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  21-­‐28.	  Professor	  Ginsburg	  suggests	  that	  unrecorded	  transfers	  would	  be	  treated	  as	  nonexclusive	  licenses.	  	  Id.	  at	  25-­‐26.	  	  I	  would	  anticipate	  that	  Ginsburg’s	  proposal	  would	  generate	  strong	  opposition	  among	  large	  copyright	  owners.	  	  The	  current	  uncertainties	  surrounding	  ownership	  described	  supra	  notes	  133	  -­‐	  138	  and	  accompanying	  text	  mean	  that	  many	   large	  copyright	  owners	  are	   less	   than	  confident	  about	   the	  clarity	  of	   their	  title	   to	   copyrights	   in	   the	   portfolio,	   and	   unsure	   about	   copyrights	   they	  may	   or	  may	   not	   own.	   From	   their	   vantage	  point,	  it	  makes	  more	  sense	  to	  maintain	  the	  staus	  quo	  and	  research	  the	  title	  of	  copyrights	  to	  works	  only	  when	  they	  decide	  they	  want	  to	  use	  them	  than	  to	  risk	  losing	  enforceable	  rights	  in	  some	  work	  they	  don’t	  yet	  know	  whether	  they	  may	  want	  to	  exploit.	  Similar	  issues	  seem	  to	  be	  fueling	  opposition	  to	  meaningful	  orphan	  works	  legislation.	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